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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Polygyny on Fertility in the United Arab 
Emirates, 1999.  (May 2009) 
Wadha Saeed Khamis Alnuaimi, B.A., United Arab Emirates 
University; 
M.A, Western Michigan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dudley L. Poston 
 
An important question in the analysis of fertility is 
does the type of marital union matter? Is women’s fertility 
affected by their marital union type? Does being in a 
monogamous or polygynous union have any effect on the 
number of children women will have? What is the nature of 
this difference? Does the social setting play a role? And, 
what kind of role does it have? Most studies, especially 
those based on African societies, where polygyny is most 
prevalent, note that female fertility is negatively 
associated with polygyny. This dissertation examines the 
polygyny-fertility relationship among married women in a 
different social setting, namely in an oil-rich country, 
that is, the United Arab Emirates. 
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 Using data from the 1999 National Family Survey for 
the Characteristics of the Native Households in the UAE, I 
was able to examine the effect of fertility using two 
statistical methods to model my dependent variables: 
Logistic Regression and Negative Binomial Regression. 
My findings show that when controlling for numerous 
biological and social variables, polygyny has a positive 
effect on women’s current fertility, which is the 
likelihood of having a baby in the past 12 months, but a 
negative effect on women’s cumulative fertility, which is 
the children ever born to them. However, when the number of 
wives in the union was introduced into the models, polygyny 
effect on women’s current and cumulative fertility has 
disappeared, i.e., polygyny no longer has a significant 
effect on women’s fertility. 
I discuss the implications of these findings for UAE 
national policy to increase the fertility of UAE women, an 
important consideration given that UAE nationals comprise 
only 20 percent of the UAE population in 2005. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 An important question in the analysis of fertility, 
one of the main demographic processes, is does the type of 
marital union matter? Is women’s fertility a consequence in 
any way of their marital type? Does being in a monogamous 
or polygynous union have any effect on the number of 
children women will have? What is the nature of this 
difference? Does the social setting play a role? And, what 
kind of role does it have? 
 These questions and others need to be answered from a 
demographic standpoint. Indeed, most the studies on 
polygyny prevalence and intensity, the characteristics of 
men and women in polygynous unions, and the effects of 
polygyny on fertility, come from anthropological 
literature. However, since the 1950s, there has been 
increased interest among demographers in polygyny as a form 
of union that might affect one of the main demographic 
processes they study, that is, fertility. 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American 
Sociological Review. 
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 Polygyny, a form of union in which a man is 
simultaneously married to more than one wife, is widely 
practiced in Africa, in some lowland South American 
societies, and in the Middle East. The proportion of 
polygynists varies widely around the world; the highest is 
among sub-Saharan nations. The Demographic Health Surveys 
(DHS) _ 1993-1996 showed that the percentages of women in 
polygynous unions range from around 19 per cent in Zimbabwe 
to around 50 per cent in Guinea (Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
 Among Muslim Arabs, contrary to popular belief, 
polygyny is not widespread and is, in fact, relatively low 
by “world standards” (Chamie 1986; Tabutin and Schoumaker 
2005). Usually no more than 19 per cent of marriages in 
Arab societies are polygynous, and in some instances its 
prevalence is between 3 and 5 per cent, for instance, in 
most North African countries, Palestine, and Syria (Tabutin 
and Schoumaker 2005). Examining the impact of polygyny on 
women’s fertility might help policymakers respond to issues 
of population policy in many Muslim Arab societies. 
 There are many demographers who have sought to examine 
the polygyny impact on women’s reproductive behavior and to 
uncover social explanations for such behavior. Their 
analyses have been undertaken in many African societies, in 
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some lowland South American societies, in some Mormon 
communities, in some non-Arab Muslim societies (e.g., in 
Bangladesh), and in some Arab non-Gulf Muslim societies 
(e.g., in Jordan and in Morocco). But, to my knowledge, 
there has not been any analyses conducted in any of the 
Arab Gulf Muslim societies about the effects of polygyny on 
the reproductive behavior of the Gulf women. 
Therefore, this dissertation will be the first study 
conducted in a Gulf country investigating the effect of 
polygyny on fertility; the focus will be on the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). The aim is to examine whether the type of 
marital union (being in a monogamous or polygynous union) 
has an independent effect on fertility and fertility 
related behavior, and how marital type union affects 
fertility. Thus, is it true, like many people believe and 
suggest, that multiple wives of a polygynist produce more 
children than a wife of a monogamist and, therefore, 
polygyny is good for societies in need of increasing their 
numbers to ultimately secure their representation and 
identity? This is certainly the situation in the UAE 
society where nationals comprise no more than 20 per cent 
of the total population of the country, an issue known as 
the demographic imbalance problem. Could increasing 
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polygyny prevalence among the nationals produce more 
children? Would this be one of the solutions for the 
demographic imbalance problem facing the UAE nationals 
today? 
Indeed, the effect of polygyny on fertility behavior 
is a complex relationship. Similar to other sociological 
and demographic relationships, it can not be satisfactorily 
addressed in a single study. As I will show later, there is 
no consensus regarding the direction of the relationship; 
some show that it is negative, others that it is positive; 
and still others that there is no relationship. Moreover, 
most of the literature has focused on Africa, partly 
because it has the highest prevalence of polygyny 
worldwide. But there is a need to examine the effect of 
polygyny on fertility behavior in different social settings 
and ascertain whether an analysis in a different social 
context results in a different or similar outcome. There is 
also a need to examine the mechanisms through which 
polygyny affects fertility.  This dissertation addresses 
the questions raised above.    
The central goals of this dissertation are: 1) to 
model the relationship between type of marital union and 
the occurrence of a birth during the last 12 months; 2) to 
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model the relationship between type of marital union and 
the number of children married woman will produce; and 3) 
to examine the mechanisms through which these polygyny-
fertility relationships occur. 
This dissertation explores the relationship between 
polygyny and whether an Emarati woman had a birth in the 
last 12 months and the number of children ever born (CEB) 
for Emarati women. If the type of marital union is 
influential in determining woman’s fertility, then there 
will be an association between whether a woman is 
polygynous and her CEB and whether she had a birth during 
the last 12 months. 
In CHAPTER II, I review the relevant literature about 
the effect of polygyny on women’s fertility behavior. This 
include concepts, polygyny in theology and practice, the 
prevalence and intensity of polygyny, polygyny functions 
and characteristics of men and women in polygynous union, 
and the theories about the relationship between polygyny 
and fertility.  
In CHAPTER III, I discuss the history, demography, and 
the social context of the study site, the society of the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). This discussion includes a 
comparison of the UAE with other Arabian Gulf countries.  
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Since most analyses of polygyny and fertility have been 
conducted in African countries, this discussion of the 
social context of the UAE helps set the stage for my 
quantitative analyses. 
In CHAPTER IV, I discuss the data and methods I use. I 
estimate two different types of regression models, Logistic 
Regression and Poisson Regression/Negative Binomial 
Regression. I also provide an operationlization and 
description of the dependent variables and independent 
variables. The chapter also includes a description of the 
characteristics of the sample used in the analysis, that 
is, the married Emarati women, and their education, 
employment, residence, duration of marriage, husband’s age, 
education, and employment. In each chapter, the dependent 
variables are reviewed. 
In CHAPTER V I discuss the characteristics of ever 
married women as demonstrated in the descriptive results of 
the National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the 
Native Households, 1999 (the survey I am using for this 
study), followed by characteristics discussion of the 
population under study, namely, the characteristics of 
married Emarati women who are only married once and that of 
their husbands. 
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CHAPTER VI examines the effect of polygyny on the 
occurrence of a birth during the last 12 months. Logistic 
Regression is used in this analysis because the occurrence 
of a birth is a binary variable. 
CHAPTER VII examines the effect of polygyny on the 
children ever born (CEB). Negative binomial Regression is 
used because CEB is a left skewed count variable and has a 
significant overdispersion. 
CHAPTER VIII discusses the results of the previous 
chapters and points to further research needed. The 
implications of this research are discussed, especially 
those having to do with UAE population policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
CHAPTER II 
LITREATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews and discusses previous studies 
that examine the effect of polygyny on female fertility. I 
organize the chapter around several themes: Concepts; 
polygyny in theology and practice; the prevalence and 
intensity of polygyny; polygyny functions and 
characteristics of men and women in polygynous union; and 
finally the theories and studies on the relationship 
between polygyny and fertility.  
CONCEPTS 
 When talking about polygyny, different concepts need 
to be clearly defined; they are: 
1) Monogamy which refers to the marriage structure in 
which there is one spouse at a time. It is the 
practice of each married person to have only one 
spouse;  
2) Polygamy which is a term denoted to mean the marriage 
structure in which there is more than one spouse at a 
time. However, some writers appear to use polygamy to 
mean marriage of one man with two or more wives, which 
should properly be termed polygyny (Marshall 1998) 
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 Polygamy can also be classified into two types of 
unions. The first, and the more common type of polygamy, is 
polygyny, which is, as mentioned above, a marriage 
structure in which a man is simultaneously married to more 
than one wife. The second type of polygamy is polyandry in 
which a woman is simultaneously married to more than one 
husband. The latter is a rarely encountered form of 
marriage, and usually occurs when a woman is married to two 
or more brothers to maintain the land and property within 
one family; this is because inheritance passes to the 
children, who are all regarded as being offspring of the 
same father(s) (Marshall 1998). 
POLYGYNY IN THEOLOGY AND PRACTICES 
 Polygyny has been practiced in many populations 
throughout history. Many cultures have accepted polygyny at 
one point in time.  It was accepted in ancient Hebrew 
society, in ancient China, in East Asia, in ancient Greece, 
in the early history of Mormons (The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints), in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Muslim 
countries. 
 This section of the chapter will focus only on Islam 
and the law of the Muslim countries regarding polygyny. 
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 Unrestricted polygyny was practiced in pre-Islamic 
Arabia. There were no limitations on the number of wives 
men could marry. The new law under Islam- the Shari’a- 
reformed marital practices, but did not abolish polygyny. 
The Shari’a accorded women a number of rights that did not 
previously exist in pre-Islamic Arabia, and thus changed 
marriage from an institution characterized by unquestioned 
male superiority to one in which the man was a desired and 
completing partner (Khadduri 1978). For example, the dowry 
was considered previously as a bride-price paid to the 
bride’s father, but after Islam it became a nuptial gift 
retained by the wife as part of her personal property 
(Khadduri 1978). 
The Shari’a also transformed the nature of marriage 
from being a “status” to being a “contract” with several 
essential elements (Khadduri 1978), as follows: an offer of 
marriage by the man through a woman’s father (or an 
entrusted representative, in case of the death of her 
father), an acceptance by the woman, and the performance of 
such conditions as the payment of the dowry in the presence 
of at least two witnesses for marriage contract. 
In theory and according to Shari’a, polygyny is 
permissible under three essential conditions: 1) the man 
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cannot have more than four wives simultaneously; 2) he must 
possess the financial means to support more than one wife; 
and 3) he must treat and give attention to each wife 
equally. 
In practice and according to laws relating to 
practices of polygyny in Muslim countries, there are three 
types of laws (Khadduri 1978; Chamie 1986):  
1) Polygyny is strictly prohibited: Two countries have 
applied this law, namely, Turkey since 1926, and Tunisia 
since 1956 (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005). Both countries 
have completely or partially abolished the Shari’a and have 
adopted a secular law. 
 2) Polygyny is permitted subject to specific judicial 
restrictions: Most of the Middle Eastern Muslim countries 
apply this law, especially Morocco, Syria, and Iraq. For 
these countries that apply such law, Shari’a is followed in 
principle, but has pursued an evolutionary course by trying 
to adopt it to modern living conditions.  In Morocco, for 
example, the wife has the right to insert into her marriage 
contract a condition that forbids the husband to marry 
another wife; violation of this agreement, gives the wife 
cause for divorce. In case there is no such clause in the 
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contract, the wife is entitled to receive compensation for 
the second marriage. 
3. Polygyny is permitted: Most countries of Arabian 
Peninsula are in this category. These countries recognize 
the Shari’a as the fundamental law, and they believe that 
there are no changes needed to its basic principles. 
Therefore, in these countries, there is little, if any, 
governmental judicial restrictions applied to those who 
wish to marry more than one wife. 
THE PREVALENCE AND INTENSITY OF POLYGYNY 
Before talking about polygyny’s prevalence and 
intensity, I should point to the different ways polygyny is 
measured. According to Dorjahn (1959) and Van de Walle 
(1968), measuring polygyny should be basic to test any 
hypothesis related to the demographic aspects of polygyny. 
The rational behind this is to assign numerical values to 
this phenomenon in order to have a clearer understanding of 
the frequency and extent of polygyny in a society. To 
examine the degree of polygyny in a society or among a 
certain group, demographers usually use three different 
types of measures (Van de Walle 1968; Timaeus and Reyndar 
1998; Welch & Glick 1981): 
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1) Incidence or prevalence of polygyny, which refers to the 
frequency of polygyny in the population. It is measured by 
the number of polygynists per 100 married men. Usually when 
the incidence exceeds 20 per cent, the population is 
described as being characterized by general polygyny. When 
the incidence is below 20 per cent, the population is 
described as being characterized by limited polygyny 
(Clignet 1970);  
2) Intensity of polygyny refers to the size of polygynous 
households. It is measured by the number of wives per 100 
polygynists;  
3) The general Index of polygyny refers to the polygyny 
ratio, or the ratio of currently married women to currently 
married men in the population, and it is measured by the 
number of married women per 100 married men. It can also be 
measured by the number of wives per number of husbands (Van 
de Walle 1968; Timaeus and Reyndar 1998; Welch & Glick 
1998).  
As previously mentioned, polygyny is found to be widely 
practiced in Africa, in some lowland South American 
societies, in the Middle East, and in the early history of 
Mormons in America (i.e. the Church of Jesus Christ of 
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Latter-Day Saints) who generally recognized the practice of 
polygyny between 1842-1890 (Bean & Mineau 1986). 
 Also, the proportion of polygynists varies around the 
world. Among Muslim Arabs and in the Middle Eastern region, 
polygyny has never been a dominant marriage system and is 
showing clear signs of decline in some societies (Tabutin 
and Schoumaker 2005). Thus, contrary to poplar belief, 
polygyny is not widespread among Muslim Arabs and is, in 
fact, relatively low by “world’s standards” (Chamie 1986; 
Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005). Usually no more than 19 per 
cent of marriages are polygynous in Arab societies, and in 
some instances its prevalence is between 3 and 5 percent, 
for instance, in most North African countries, Palestine, 
and Syria (Tabutin and Schoumaker  2005); and substantially 
higher (around 8 to 19 per cent) in the Arabian Gulf 
countries.  Conversely, the levels of polygyny among non-
Arabs are between 19 and 50 per cent in some sub-Saharan 
nations according to the data from Demographic and Health 
Surveys 1993-1996  (Timaeus & Reynar 1998).  
These polygyny percentages for sub-Saharan nations were 
noticeably different when Dorjahn (1959) reviewed early 
data on 155 societies in sub-Saharan Africa. He found that 
the proportion of married men who were polygynous ranged 
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from 4 per cent to 91 per cent, with an overall mean of 35 
per cent.  
Table 1 draws on data from previous studies and shows 
the prevalence of polygyny in different societies. 
According to the Demographic and Heath Surveys (DHS)            
1993-1996, Guinea (around 50 per cent) had the highest 
percentage of currently married women in polygynous unions, 
Mali was next (44.3 per cent), and Zimbabwe was the last 
(19 per cent) (Timaeus & Reynar 1998).   
As previously mentioned, the prevalence of polygyny in 
Arabian Gulf societies (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Oman, and Bahrain) is higher than anywhere else in the 
Middle East. According to the 2000 Gulf Family Health 
Surveys, of all currently married women aged less than 50, 
19 per cent of Saudi women were in polygynous unions; it is 
a comparable percentage with some African societies, such 
as Zimbabwe. UAE had the second highest percentage of 
currently married women in polygynous unions (14.5 per 
cent), Oman was the third (11 per cent), Kuwait was the 
fourth (9 per cent), and Bahrain and Qatar were the last (8 
per cent). 
In some lowland South American societies, among Shipibo, 
for example, the rate of polygynously married men is 7.1 
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per cent, with 9.8 per cent of all women of reproductive 
age (aged 15+ years) in polygynous union, and as high as 50 
per cent found to be polygynously married men among the 
Yanomama families (Hern 1992). Among Mormons, at its 
highest, polygyny was practiced by a minority of not more 
than 10 per cent (Smith and Kunz 1976). 
 Regarding the intensity of polygyny, almost 90 per 
cent or more of polygynous Arab Muslim males have two wives 
(Chamie 1986). In the United Arab Emirates, around 6.0 per 
cent of married national men were polygynists in 1975 
(compared to 11.5 per cent among nationals in Kuwait), and 
92.7 per cent of them had two wives (Chamie 1986). 
According to data from the 1999 National Family Survey of 
the UAE (the dataset I am using in my dissertation), 13.4 
per cent of currently married national men are polygynists, 
and almost 82 per cent of them are married to two wives.  
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Table 1.  Prevalence of Polygynous Marriages in Previous 
Studies 
 
 
Population Polygynous 
Marriage % 
Reference 
Arab Countries 
 
Lebanona 1971
Jordan(East Bank 
only)a1979 
Algeriaa 1966 
Egypta 1960 
Libyaa 1973 
Moroccoa 1952 
Syriaa 1976 
Iraqa 1960 
Yemena 1975
 
Arabian Gulf Countries 
 
UAEa 1975 
UAE  1999 
 
UAE  2000 
Kuwaita 1965 
Kuwaita 1970 
Kuwaita 1975 
Kuwait  2000 
Bahraina1981 
Bahrain 2000 
Qatar 2000 
Oman 2000 
Saudi Arabia 2000 
 
Muslim Countries 
 
Matlab, Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
7.5 
 
1.8 
3.8 
3.3 
6.6 
1.9 
3.8 
4.5 
 
 
 
6.0 
13.4 
 
14.4 
6.7 
8.8 
11.7 
9.0 
5.4 
8.0 
8.0 
11.0 
19.0 
 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
 
 
 
Chamie (1986) 
1999 National 
Family survey 
2000 GFHSb
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
Chamie (1986) 
2000  GFHSb
Chamie (1986) 
2000  GFHSb
2000  GFHSb
2000  GFHSb
2000  GFHSb
 
 
 
Shaikh et al. 
(1987) 
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 Table 1.  Continued 
Population Polygynous 
Marriage % 
Reference 
 
 
African Countries 
 
Zimbabwec
Kenyac
Ugandac
Malic
Guineac
 
South American 
Societies 
 
Shipibo a
Cashinahua families a
Y
 
anomama a
Among the Mormons 
 
 
 
 
18.6 
19.5 
29.9 
44.3 
49.6 
 
 
 
 
7.1 
27 
50 
 
Not more 
than 10% 
 
 
 
 
Timaeus& Reynar (1998) 
Timaeus& Reynar (1998) 
Timaeus& Reynar (1998) 
Timaeus& Reynar (1998) 
Timaeus& Reynar (1998) 
 
 
 
 
Hern, 1992 
Hern, 1992 
Hern, 1992 
 
(Smith & Kunz, 1976) 
 
 
a The Prevalence rate was calculated based on male subjects 
b  2000 Gulf Family Health Surveys(Mohammed 2003) 
C The study cited data from the Demographic and Health Survey based 
on percentage of women in polygynous marriages. 
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POLYGYNY: ITS FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN AND 
WOMEN IN POLYGYNOUS UNION 
 
The Functions of Polygyny 
One should understand that polygyny is considered as a 
functional part of the functioning whole in the 
preservation of the family and lineage (Hillman 1975; 
Kolmegah 1997), especially in patrilineal kinship systems 
in which polygyny is found to be more prevalent than in 
matrilineal kinship systems (Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
Thus, in traditional societies a large number of children 
is needed to ensure the continuity of the family line 
through male heirs.  In the polygynous family, as some 
demographers have pointed out, the total number of children 
born (by all wives together) exceeds the total number of 
children born in monogamous families; this is one of the 
main demographic and cultural reasons for polygyny (Muhsam 
1956). Therefore, polygyny is most common among hunters or 
in pastoral societies like that of the Bedouin, if they are 
patrilineal and the wealth and power of the family is the 
main social goal of the individual, as well as if both 
wealth and power can be secured through raising the number 
of its members (Muhsam 1956).  
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Also, polygyny is found in societies of subsistence food 
production where a large number of children is needed to 
provide labor for the family and to ensure the presence of 
children because the average rate of child mortality is 
usually very high (Kolmegah 1997). 
Moreover, polygyny is found in societies where children 
are valued not only for their labor, but also for their 
emotional support and old-age security for their parents 
(Kolmegah 1997). Thus, in a society where the desire for 
many children is the highest concern of spouses, the 
practice of polygyny is socially acceptable and is often 
considered the surest means of achieving societal ideal 
goals (Kolmegah 1997). Furthermore, children in these 
societies are considered as a symbol of importance and 
success in life. Since socio-economic security and family 
stability in traditional societies usually depend on the 
number of children in the household, it seems that 
polygynous households are desirable in such societies.  
Polygyny is also found to be more prevalent among Muslim 
groups than among Christian groups in the same population 
(such as in Africa) (Timaeus and Reynar 1998.) This family 
type is also less prevalent in societies where more adult 
women are literate (Timaeus and Reynar 1998). In general, 
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in polygynous societies, marriage tends to be universal, 
female age at marriage tends to be early, and women tend to 
remarry early after divorce or widowhood (Lardoux and Van 
de Walle 2003). 
In summary, Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1960) proposed 
three basic reasons for the persistence of polygyny, 
especially in Africa: 1) to obtain and demonstrate social 
status. Thus, historically, men who were able to acquire 
additional wives found themselves in a more advantageous 
position, and having once achieved such a position they 
were expected to take more wives than men of lower status; 
2) to secure an appropriate labor force, especially sons 
who are needed to expand the family’s labor force. In the 
partrilineal system of kinship, girls are regarded as 
liabilities because as soon as they marry- and they marry 
early- they move into the husband’s home, while sons are 
considered to strengthen their families by marriage 
(Chojnacka 1980); and 3) to fulfill sexual necessity since 
intercourse during pregnancy and the post-partum period is 
frequently forbidden by customs and taboos in some 
societies. For example, after the birth of a child, the 
mean period of postnatal abstinence in Ibadan (Nigeria) is 
around 22 months: 24 months for women in polygynous 
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marriages versus 20 months for women in monogamous 
marriages (Ware 1975). 
Furthermore, polygyny is motivated by the need for 
alliances between extended families and clans, in other 
words, “polygyny is a function of social solidarity on the 
level of the extended family, the clan and the tribal or 
ethnic community” (Hillan 1975: 117-18). 
 Finally, some argue that polygyny might well influence 
the population growth rate by producing more children. 
However, Chojnacka (1980) stresses that “the major 
demographic consequences of polygyny is reflected in the 
very young nuptiality pattern for women which directly 
affects the rate of population growth” (1980: 106). Thus, 
what affects population growth might not be the polygyny 
prevalence by itself, but the fact that women in polygynous 
marriages marry at young ages and therefore produce more 
children in the population than women in monogamous 
marriage. 
Characteristics of Men and Women in Polygynous Marriages  
 
The type of marriage women and men choose to enter is 
to a great extent determined by their personal 
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characteristics, their economic, social, and cultural 
environments, and by the opportunities they encounter. 
Studies have shown that the characteristics of men and 
women who enter a polygynous union are as follows: 
First: Age 
 There is a general consensus in the literature 
regarding the age difference between women in polygynous 
and monogamous unions, and regarding the age difference 
between polygynists and their wives. Chojnacka (1980) shows 
that age at first marriage is lower among polygynous than 
monogamous couples for both husbands and wives. Monogamous 
wives marry about one to two years later than polygamous 
wives. The mean ages at first marriage are between 15-21 
and 22-27 years for women and men respectively (Chojnacka 
1980). However, it is not surprising that she shows that 
the difference in age between spouses at first marriage is 
similar in both types of unions; it ranges from 8 to 10 
years, and widens in polygamous unions for each additional 
wife (Chojnacka 1980). Thus, the first wives in polygynous 
union share similar average age of monogamous wives because 
first wives of polygynists were monogamous wives for some 
time before their husband decided to marry another wife or 
wives; they have a wider age difference between them and 
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their husbands. This was confirmed by Varea and colleagues 
(1996) when they showed that polygynous marriages are 
characterized by great age difference between spouses 
(around 15 years) in Marrakech (Morocco).  
However, Muhsam’s (1956) study of the Bedouin of 
Negaeb shows that, on average, first wives of polygamous 
husbands are much older (median age 40 years), and second 
wives somewhat younger (median age 28 years) than only 
wives of monogamous husbands (median age 32 years). 
 In fact, the type of union is not the only factor that 
determines the age at first marriage; there are other 
factors such as the level of education. Chojnacka (1980) 
shows that age at first marriage is positively related to 
the level of education of both the husband and wife. A 
clear-cut tendency appears; “The higher the educational 
attainment the later the age at first marriage among 
polygamous and monogamous couples alike” (Chojnacka 1980: 
104). 
Moreover, as young single women tend to be more 
attractive brides than divorcees, widows, and women who 
remain single until an older age, these young single women 
are more likely to become higher-order wives than a man’s 
first partner (Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
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Second: Education 
Generally more educated men and women are more likely 
to enter monogamous unions (Ohadike 1968; Chamie 1986; Shan 
2004). Also those who are having modern education are less 
likely to enter polygynous marriages than the uneducated 
(Chojnacka 1980; Shaikh, Aziz, and Chowdhury 1987; Brown 
1981; Chamie 1996; Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
However, Timaeus and Rydnar (1998) posit that women            
who have achieved a high level of education, and remained 
single into their twenties or thirties, might well have 
acquired a strong preference for a monogamous marriage. But 
their older age and, perhaps, their increased level of 
education, could well make them less attractive prospective 
wives for single men. Thus they may be unable to realize 
their preference for a monogamous marriage and thus accept 
a proposal from a polygynist (Timmaeus and Reynar 1998). 
Third:  Religion  
Some studies show that among different believers in a 
population, the rate of polygyny tends to be higher for 
both traditional believers and Muslims than for other 
believers. For example, in Nigeria, a study by Kolmegah 
(1997) found that the percentages of polygyny were 47.2 per 
cent for Muslims and 37.5 per cent for traditional 
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worshippers, compared to 23.3 per cent for Protestants and 
17.3 per cent for Catholics. Chojnacka (19980) and Timaeus 
and Reynar (1998) also report these findings in various 
African populations. 
Fourth: Residence 
As suggested by many sociologists and demographers, 
urbanization and industrialization are processes that tend 
to weaken the traditional extended family systems and lower 
the process of polygyny through two of the most powerful 
agents of Westernization: schooling and the exposure to 
mass media (Caldwell 1980). Thus, the degree of access to 
education, to the media, and to the consumption of western 
goods often determine the matrimonial preferences (Timaeus 
and Reynar 1998).  Therefore, one expects to find polygyny 
to be more prevalent in rural areas compared to urban areas 
where both schooling and the exposure to mass media are 
more prevalent. Also because of the high cost of living in 
urban areas, housing shortages and financial difficulties, 
one would expect polygyny to be less prevalent in urban 
areas than rural areas (Caldwell 1975). Furthermore, 
urbanization and industrialization have brought social 
change to societies through increasing girls’ access to 
education, media, and western culture; they have also 
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lessened the practice of postpartum abstinence; all of this 
contributes to a decrease in the practice of polygyny in 
urban areas.  Accordingly, more women in urban areas are 
likely to be in monogamous marriages than in polygynous 
marriages. In Ghana, for example, 75.2 per cent of wives in 
urban settlements are monogamous, whereas only 24.8 per 
cent of them are polygynous. In the rural settings, 65.5 
per cent of wives are married to monogamists, versus 34.5 
per cent of them married to polygynists (Kolmegah 1997). 
Fifth: Duration of Marriage 
Polygyny is more likely to increase with marital 
duration (and therefore age) among both men and women 
(Ohadike 1968; Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
Sixth: Occupation 
Many studies in various populations show a 
relationship between polygyny and occupation. Some studies 
in Africa show that polygynous marriages prevail among 
farmers, traders, and manual workers; and they are less 
frequent among non-agricultural, non-manual workers and 
professionals (Chojnacka 1980; Timaeus and Reynar 1998). 
Also, Shaikh and his colleagues’ (1987) study in Bangladesh 
show that there is a tendency for farmers in rural areas 
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and wealthy businessmen in urban areas, to marry a second 
wife for the purposes of domestic and farm help. 
Chamie’s (1986) study of Arab societies also shows 
that among Arab Muslim populations, the proportions of 
polygynously married men are highest among the financially 
better-off (who are not necessarily the most educated), and 
are lowest among those in occupations requiring most formal 
education, i.e., professional and technical occupations, 
and among those who are in relatively less lucrative 
occupations, requiring little formal education, i.e.; 
clerical, service, and associated occupations 
Moreover, not only does a man’s occupation have an 
effect on whether he is polygynous; also the wife’s 
parent’s occupation might influence the chances of marrying 
a polygynist. Ahamd’s (1986) study of the Yoruba (Nigeria) 
finds that the higher the occupational levels of the 
woman’s parent, the less likely she will be married to a 
polygynist. 
Seventh: Infertility 
Some studies indicate that infecund women may be less 
likely to be monogamously married and more likely to end up 
as first wives in polygamous marriages (Chojnacka 1980; 
Chamie 1986; Timaeus and Rydnar 1998; Mulder 1989). Varea 
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and colleagues (1996) also found that polygynous marriages 
in Marrakech are characterized by a significant increase in 
childless women and women who were previously married. They 
also found that the sterility of the first wife favors the 
inclusion of a second wife into the union, and that it is 
the divorcees and the widows who mostly enter already 
established marriages.  
Eight:  Wealth 
The intensity of polygyny is greater among wealthy men 
and those who are financially better- off (Chamie 1986; 
Shan 2004). Also, rich men tend to engage in more 
polygynous unions in societies where the payment of 
bridewealth is the common practice (Timaeus and Reynar 
1998). One of the reasons is that rich men are more able to 
meet the wedding expenses and the costs of providing for 
multiple houses than are non-rich men. Others suggest that 
polygyny is higher among wealthy men not because they are 
more likely to take additional wives but because their 
wives are less likely to divorce them (Ohadike 1968; Brown 
1981; Timaeus and Reynar 1998). Thus, men’s increased 
wealth is a cause and a consequence of polygyny (Lardoux 
and Van de Walle 2003).  
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THEORIES OF POLYGYNY AND FERTILITY 
There are three principle theories about the 
relationship between polygyny and fertility behavior. I 
will discuss each of them. 
First: Sexual Competition Model 
 This model is a biological explanation of the 
fertility differential between polygynous and monogamous 
wives. It presumes that the lower fertility among both 
polygynous women and higher-order wives is due in part to 
the presumed reduction in coital frequency of each woman, 
as the husband must divide his time among all his wives, 
presumably increasing sexual competition and decreasing the 
risk of pregnancy for each wife (Muhsam 1956). Also the 
addition of another wife may involve the establishment of a 
separate place of residence for the new wife, sometimes at 
a great distance from the others, further reducing the 
frequency of sexual intercourse for the more distant wife 
(Muhsam 1956; Bean and Mineau 1986). 
There are numerous analyses in the literature showing 
this negative relationship between polygyny and fertility 
(Musham 1956; Ivins 1956; Dorjahn 1958;Van de Walle 1965; 
Henin 1969; Page 1975; Ukaegbu 1977; Brown 1981; Farooq 
1985; Bhatia 1985; Shaikh et al. 1987;Garenne and Van de 
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Walle 1989;  Hern 1992; Josephson 2002; Lardoux and Van de 
Walle 2003). Several factors have been shown to account for 
the fertility differential. In their study of Senegal, 
Garonne and Van de Walle (1989) argue that husband’s age 
and co-residence status have important effects on this 
difference. Thus, the fertility of older husbands, 
especially those aged over 50, seems to be lower due to 
both lower fecundability and, less so, to lower coital 
frequency.  Also, an important consideration is the 
separate residence status of many women in polygynous 
unions. Thus, polygynists’ wives usually spend more time 
separated from their husbands, which tends to lower their 
fertility.  
 Second: Favoritism Model 
This model provides more of a sociological explanation 
of fertility differentials than the previous model. It 
argues that favoritism toward certain wives, or certain 
types of wives, could reduce the fertility of other wives, 
irrespective of marriage order, and could also presumably 
reduce the fertility of the less preferred wives relative 
to that of their monogamous counterparts (Muhsam 1956; 
Garenne and Van de Walle 1989). In general, younger wives 
who are higher-order wives in the union are sexually 
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preferred. Therefore, they tend to have higher fertility 
than lower-order wives (Lardoux and van de Walle 2003).  
This model is more concerned with fertility differences 
among different kinds of polygynous wives. But it does 
posit that on average most polygynous wives will have fewer 
children than monogamous wives. 
In their study of rural Senegal, Lardoux and van de 
Walle (2003) show that after controlling for age and number 
of wives in the union, wives of higher rank tend to have 
higher fertility than wives of lower rank. They interpret 
this finding as evidence of “favouritism” by the husband, 
resulting in a higher frequency of intercourse with the 
latest arrival among his wives. Muhsam (1956) also found 
that second wives had higher fertility than first wives, 
though not consistently in all age groups. His explanation 
was that the lower frequency of sexual intercourse may 
affect both the first and second wives, but most probably 
affects the first wife more than the second. 
Third: Male Demand for Progeny 
This model states that, on average, polygynous wives 
should have more children than monogamous wives. It argues 
that men marry additional wives mainly to satisfy their 
desire for a large number of progeny (Muhsam 1956; 
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Chojnacka 1980; Ukaegbu 1981). Thus, one of the main 
reasons for men to have multiple marriages is to have many 
children (Blance and Gage 2000). However, the fertility of 
more recent wives may be affected by a declining demand for 
children as the stock of progeny by earlier wives saturates 
both the demand for children and the ability to provide for 
offspring (Anderton and Emigh 1989). Thus, many studies 
show that higher-order wives tend to have fewer children 
than lower-order wives (Ukaegbu 1977; Smith and Kunz 1976; 
Sween and Clignet 1978; Bean and Mineau 1986; Anderton and 
Emigh 1989; Josephson 2002).  
Ukaegbu (1977) explains this fertility differential by 
the age disparity between the polygynists and their wives. 
Polygyny reduces fertility through the intermediary of a 
comparatively wider age differential between polygynists 
and their wives. Anderson and Emigh (1989) indicate that 
the fertility of earlier wives is largely determined and 
affects the continuing fertility of more recent wives. In 
other words, the fertility of all wives will decline, not 
as additional wives are taken but as the stock of children 
born to all wives reaches some limit of demand or of 
capacity to provide for offspring. 
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 Regardless of who will have more children, the lower-
order wives or the higher-order wives, the end result is 
that on average polygynous wives will have more children 
than monogamous wives (Sembajwe 1979; Arowolo 1981; 
Sueyoshi and Ohtsuka 2003). 
There are also other studies that show a marginal, if 
slight, differential in fertility between the women in 
polygynous and monogamous unions (Ohadike 1968; Pool 1968; 
Olusanya 1971; Seetharam and Duza 1976; Chojnacka 1980; 
Logue 1984; Ahmed 1986; Sichona 1993). 
Other studies have criticized the polygyny and 
fertility hypothesis. They have argued for a need to re-
evaluate the hypothesis. Bean and Mineau (1986), for 
example, argue that the comparison of the fertility of 
polygynous wives with monogamous wives is inappropriate.  
They suggest that fertility will vary by wife-order in 
multiple-wife families, especially when replacement of 
infertile (childless) first wives is not a main motive for 
polygyny and when there is equitable treatment of multiple 
wives. Also several studies have found that the fertility 
of first-order wives is not at all different from that of 
monogamous wives, but being a second or a third-wife will 
depress fertility (Smith and Kunz 1976). Furthermore, 
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fertility tends to decrease with the increase in the number 
of wives in the union (Lardoux and Van de Walle 2003). 
 Mulder (1989) also argues that in order to conclude 
that the low fertility of polygynously married women is a 
consequence of their marital status, one must rule out a 
number of alternative explanations: One is that there must 
be no evidence of a selection process though which women of 
low reproductive potential, especially those who are 
infertile, are more likely to be found in polygynous 
marriage. Second, secular changes, especially those that 
co-vary with marital status, must be carefully eliminated 
as the causes of reproductive differences between women in 
both monogamous and polygynous unions. Furthermore, Varea, 
Crognier and colleagues (1996), in their study of polygyny 
and fertility in Morocco, found that differences in female 
fertility are not determined by type of marriage. The lower 
fertility of polygynously married women tends more to be 
due to their greater previous marital instability, a result 
confirmed by Johnson and Elmi (1989). This reduction of 
fertility due to previous marital disruption (having 
married more than once) persists even after controlling for 
the rest of the matrimonial variables.  
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Furthermore, Ezeh (1997) and Agadjanian and Ezeh 
(2000) have argued that polygyny is not an individual-level 
variable; therefore, its impact on fertility cannot be 
understood by simply comparing the reproductive behavior of 
monogamously and polygynously women (or men). Thus, being 
in a polygynous union is not entirely the women’s 
individual choice, at least not for the first wives in 
polygynous unions. Many forces determine women’s odds of 
being in polygynous union which also affect her 
reproductive desires. The argument is that the incidence of 
polygyny in a population could indicate the strength of 
prenatalism in that population. The gender differences in 
reproductive desires tend to increase with increasing 
levels of polygyny. Both Ezeh (1997) and Agadjanian and 
Ezeh (2000) show that men and women in low-polygyny areas 
express similar reproductive desires, whereas men in high 
polygyny areas desire more children, on average, than women 
in the same regime. Also, their results show that women in 
areas of high polygyny have higher fertility desires and 
they adopt behavioral patterns consistent with the 
achievement of high fertility goal. Thus to achieve their 
high-fertility goals, women in high-polygyny areas often 
start their sexual and reproductive activity much earlier 
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and are more likely to remain in union once initiated. They 
are also less likely to adopt practices, such as 
contraception, that lower their fertility. In high-
polygynous areas men attain higher fertility goals by 
marrying multiple wives.  
In summary, although there is no consensus in the 
literature on the effect of polygyny on female fertility, 
most studies, especially those conducted in Africa, seem to 
agree that polygyny is usually negatively associated with 
female fertility. Also fertility is negatively associated 
with the order of the polygynous wives. Specific studies, 
however, counter these general findings, which reflect the 
variety of mechanisms that may be affecting the fertility 
of polygynous women (Anderson and Emigh 1989; Garonne and 
Van de Walle 1989). Indeed, there is a need to conduct more 
studies that examine the precise mechanisms through which 
polygyny may reduce fertility (Ukaegbu 1977).  
This dissertation will take into account some of the 
criticisms of earlier literature. To avoid some of the 
methodological problems indicated by several researchers, 
my dissertation will include two dependent variables to 
measure female fertility: children ever born; and whether 
the woman had a birth in the past 12 months. The analysis 
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in this dissertation will also restrict the sample to 
currently married women who have been married only once. 
These restrictions are introduced in my dissertation 
because many researchers have shown that marital 
instability (the number of marriages a woman has) affects 
the number of live births (Varea, et al. 1996;  Mulder 
1989). 
CONCLUSION 
 Most studies on polygyny’s effects on fertility have 
been conducted in African countries. Very few studies have 
examined this phenomenon in Muslim and Arab countries. 
Thus, in Arab countries, to my knowledge, the effects of 
polygyny on reproductive behavior have been examined only 
in Jordan and Morocco. No studies have been conducted in 
the Arabian Peninsula.  Also the effect of polygyny on 
fertility is complex. Similar to other sociological and 
demographic relationships, it can not be satisfactorily 
addressed in a single study. As we saw, there is no 
consensus regarding the direction of the relationship; some 
show that it is negative, others that it is positive; and 
still others that there is no relationship. These 
contradictory findings suggest the need to study the 
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mechanism through which polygyny may or may not affect 
fertility.    
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the social 
context of the study site, the society of the United Arab 
Emirates. Since most analyses of polygyny and fertility 
have been conducted in African countries, this discussion 
of the social context of the UAE will help set the stage 
for my quantitative analyses. I will also put forth in the 
next chapter the hypotheses for my dissertation and the 
reasons for such hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER III 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
This chapter will discuss the history, demography, and 
social context of the United Arab Emirates. This will 
include a comparison of the UAE with the demography of the 
other Arabian Gulf countries (also known as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries (GCC)), that is, with Qatar, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. And finally, I 
will put forth the four hypothesizes I will later test. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UAE  
  The United Arab Emirates is located in the Gulf area 
of Western Asia. Appendix A contains two maps, namely, the 
Asian region and the UAE; these may be used to locate the 
UAE geographically. The United Arab Emirates is an oil rich 
Arab Gulf Muslim country. Oil exportation income, mainly in 
existence since the early 1950s, has generated a huge 
transformation in many aspects of UAE political and 
socioeconomic life as well as the lives of all the GCC 
countries. The degree of these transformations has been so 
profound that local writers often distinguish between two 
eras in their modern history: pre-oil and post-oil (Khalaf 
and Alkobaisi 1999).  The discovery of oil in the GCC 
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countries has occurred in various decades. Oil was 
discovered in Bahrain in 1933, in Saudi Arabia in 1938, in 
Kuwait in 1946, in Qatar in 1949, in UAE in 1962, and in 
Oman in 1967.  Nevertheless, these countries share many 
similarities in terms of the development of their political 
and socio-economic structures to the extent that together 
they constitute a unique societal type specific to this 
oil-rich region that is different from the developed 
capitalist industrial societies or those of the developing 
Third World societies (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999).  For the 
UAE, the economic factor, namely, the discovery of oil, was 
not the only factor that marked the beginning of the 
modernization of the country. Along with it was another 
significant factor, a political factor, that marked the 
beginning of the country’s modernization. I refer here to 
the unionization of the seven individual states of the UAE, 
referred to as Emirates, namely, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, 
Ajman, Ras-Al-khaimah, Umm Al-Quwain, and Fujairah, into a 
single country on the second of December 1971. This 
unification has initiated even more changes in all life 
aspects in the UAE than the discovery of oil. 
 Before the discovery of oil (prior to 1962), the UAE 
was a traditional society in its economic and social 
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structures. The economic structure was based on fishing and 
diving for pearls, which attracted 85 per cent of the 
people. Since the 19th century, trading was an important 
economic activity mainly in the coastal cities. Most of the 
trade was outside the country, and it was based on 
exchanges, such as horses, carpets, and seeds for pearls, 
dates, and dry fish (Helmi 1999). There were also minor 
agricultural activities which were restricted to the oases.  
 The social structure of the UAE was a tribal system. A 
tribal society was based on social classes that varied 
according to family bloodline, authority and wealth (Al 
Qasemi 1998). The family structure was based on extended 
family units (two generations or more living in a same 
house). Marriages were maintained endogamously (marriage 
from inside the tribe), especially between parallel cousins 
(the brothers’ children). It was common for people to get 
married at early ages (as early as age 12) and to have many 
children (seven and more). 
 After the discovery of oil and the unionizing of the 
seven emirates, the most important processes of change were 
1) establishing political, financial, educational, and 
health institutions, and other public facilities; 2) 
changing the human ecology of the society by transforming 
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many parts of the desert to urban areas and by creating a 
multi-ethnic culture within the society itself; 3) 
increasing rates of internal migration from rural areas to 
the centers of cities; and 4) importing foreign labor 
(Arabs and non-Arabs) from all over the world. 
 According to the Ministry of Planning, the population 
of the UAE in 2005 is overwhelmingly urban, with more than 
83 percent of the people living in cities. The largest 
city, Abu Dhabi, the federal capital, had a population of 
1,399,484 in 2005. Dubai, the second largest city and the 
UAE's main port and commercial center, had a population of 
1,321,453. The residential neighborhoods along the Arabian 
Gulf coast north of the center of Dubai were contiguous 
with those of the city of Sharjah (with a population of 
793,573). Sharjah in turn flowed into the city of Ajman 
(with a population of 206,997). The other Emirates had a 
population of 210,063 for Ras-al-Khaimah, 125,698 for 
Fujairah, and 49,159 for Umm-Al-Quwain. 
Despite there is no federal UAE standard for 
classifying urban areas, most emirates in UAE are divided 
into urban and nonurban centers (rural areas), not by 
population size as in the case of the US, but mostly by how 
far is the distance from the emirate’s city center. 
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Sometimes that means less municipality services in those 
rural areas (in USA referred to as "the country" or "the 
countryside"). They are also large and isolated areas of a 
country, often with low populations. Figure 25 (in Appendix 
A) shows the population density of the UAE based on the 
1980 Census. 
In the economic side, after the discovery of oil, the 
country set many economic goals that would bring more 
changes to the society.  These goals were to increase 
foreign investment and to establish new social groups. 
These social groups include: Civil servants, who were 
originally working in diving, pasturage, and minor 
agriculture activities; new merchants, especially in the 
importing of goods, who played the main role in connecting 
local markets with global markets; and immigrants who came 
to the country after the discovery of oil (Aboelenein 
1999). 
 Today, the UAE is a rapidly growing economy with a 
high GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita. The 
GDP per capita of $55,200 is currently the 7th highest in 
the world and 3rd in the Middle East after Qatar and Kuwait 
(as reported in the CIA World Factbook in 2008). There are 
several estimates of the actual growth rate of the nation’s 
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GDP. Despite their differences, all indicate that the UAE 
currently has one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world.  
 Therefore, the social structure of the post-oil 
discovery may be outlined by four main changes, namely, the 
changes in family structure from an extended family to a 
nuclear family, the increase in exogamous marriages 
(marriages from outside the tribe), the increase of age at 
marriage for both men and women, and the changes in women’s 
roles, especially after attaining higher education and 
participating actively in the labor force. In the next 
sections I will discuss the social context of today’s UAE 
society in more detail. 
THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE UAE 
 The United Arab Emirates is a country of 4.5 million 
people in 2008 according to the Population Reference Bureau 
(2008). Among the GCC countries, the population of 4.5 
million puts the UAE in second place distantly behind Saudi 
Arabia with 28.1 million in 2008; Kuwait and Oman, each 
with 2.7 million, are tied for third, Qatar (around 
900,000) is in fifth place, and Bahrain (800,000) is in 
last place (Population Reference Bureau 2008). 
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The basic demographic information about the UAE shows 
that the country’s birth and death rates in 2008 are 
25/1,000 and 6/1,000, resulting in the lowest rate of 
natural increase of the GCC countries of 1.3 per cent, 
compared to 2.7 per cent for Saudi Arabia, 2.1 for Oman, 
1.9 for Kuwait, 1.7 for Bahrain, and 1.5 for Qatar. The 
country has a very low infant mortality rate of 7/1,000 and 
a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.0, just below replacement 
fertility levels (Population Reference Bureau 2008). The 
UAE fertility rate is the lowest among the GCC countries. 
As Figure 1 shows, among the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia 
has the highest TFR of 4.0, then Oman with 3.4, Qatar and 
Kuwait with 2.6 each, and Bahrain with 2.5. Unlike the UAE 
and Qatar, during the past three decades, the increase in 
the size of the population of Saudi nationals (as well as 
Oman nationals) has been primarily due to natural increase, 
namely, relatively high fertility and rapidly declining 
mortality (Lingawi 2005).  
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Figure 1. Total Fertility Rates in the GCC, 2008
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 The UAE and other GCC countries have experienced a 
considerable decline in fertility. Figure 2 shows the 
continuous decline in UAE fertility since the 1970s. Also, 
the fertility rates in the GCC countries have undergone 
considerable change. Figure 3 shows these declines since 
1990 and gives a prediction of a continuous decline in the 
coming years for all the GCC countries. 
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Figure 2.  UAE Total Fertility Rates, 1975-
           2020
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Figure 3. Total Fertility Rates in the GCC, 1990-2050
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Unlike virtually all countries of the world, except for 
Qatar, the majority, indeed over 80 per cent, of the 
population of the UAE is comprised of non-citizens of the 
UAE, that is, persons not born in the UAE. Table 2 shows 
the number of international migrants as a percentage of the 
total population for the six GCC countries for different 
years from 1960 to 2005. Figure 4 also shows the 
progression and trend of the number of international 
migrants in all the GCC countries from 1960 to 2000. 
 
Table 2.  International Migrants as a Percentage of the 
          Total Population for the  GCC Countries, 1960- 
          2005 
 
Year 
 
UAE 
 
Qatar 
 
Kuwait 
 
Bahrain 
 
Oman 
 
Saudi Arabia 
1960 2.4 32 32.6 17.1 5.6 1.6 
1965 18 48.7 51.1 20.1 5.8 3.3 
1970 29.3 61.4 62.3 17.3 5.4 6.2 
1975 58.9 69.6 65.7 22.1 8.2 12.8 
1980 70.8 72.2 69.6 29.8 15.2 20 
1985 71.5 78.2 71.1 33.1 21.4 26.4 
1990 71.2 79.1 72.4 35.1 24.5 29 
1995 70.5 77.2 58.7 37.5 26.3 24.7 
2000 70.4 76 62.2 37.8 24.8 23.9 
2005 80 78.3 62.1 40.7 24.4 25.9 
Source: United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population 
Division. 2005. Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision 
http://esa.un.org/migration. 
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Figure 4.  International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population
           in the Arabian Gulf Countries, 1960-2005
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The citizen and non-citizen populations of the UAE are 
very different from one another. In addition, the non-
citizen population is four times larger than the citizen 
population. Figure 5 is an age-sex population pyramid of 
the total population of the UAE in 2005. This is the 
combined population, combining both citizens (Emaratis) and 
non-citizens (non-Emaratis). This is a hugely unbalanced 
population with tremendously large numbers of young men as 
a result of high levels of migration. 
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Figure 5.  Age-Sex Structure of UAE Population, 2005
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Figure 6 is an age-sex population pyramid of the 
citizen (Emarati) population of the UAE. This is a much 
more balanced population than that of the total UAE shown 
in Figure 7. 
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Figure 6 . Age-Sex Structure of UAE Nationals, 2005 
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As shown in Figure 7 more than half of the population 
of the UAE in 2005 (about 58 per cent) came from Asian non 
Arab countries, mainly India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, 
with relatively smaller proportions coming from Indonesia, 
Philippines, Korea, and China. The second largest group 
came from other Arab countries (17.25 per cent). Less than 
2 per cent came from the GCC countries and the same small 
percentage came from the European countries; and fewer 
people came from the African non Arab countries and from 
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North American countries (both accounted for 1.31 per 
cent). 
Figure 7.  UAE Population by Sex and Nationality, 2005
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In this dissertation I am studying the fertility 
patterns of women in the childbearing ages from the citizen 
(Emarati) population.  
The very high proportion of non-citizens (80 per cent) 
in the UAE has created what is called today, the 
demographic imbalance problem. Thus, since the oil price 
rises in the 1970s and 1980s, the rate of economic 
development has been significant in the UAE as well as in 
other GCC countries. As in other Gulf countries, the UAE 
local population in the pre-oil era was small and lacked 
the technical skills needed for modernizing the traditional 
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society.  As a result, the major State policy was to import 
all levels of skilled laborers. The inflow of foreign 
laborers and professionals has continued in such large 
numbers that in some Gulf societies, namely UAE, Qatar, and 
Kuwait, the nationals have become minorities in their own 
countries.  The most extreme case is the UAE where in 2005 
the UAE census revealed that the nationals are only 20 per 
cent of the total population. Thus, after about thirty four 
years since its establishment, UAE nationals constitute a 
small percentage of the total population. 
  Indeed, the massive investment in social and economic 
infrastructure required large number of foreign workers.  
Migrant labor was required in construction projects, 
industry, trade, and services, including household services 
(Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan 2003). Currently, nationals 
are highly concentrated in the governmental sector (Sabban 
2003). Moreover, the UAE is also considered one of the 
countries with strong pull factors for foreign migrants to 
the extent that its economy is becoming almost fully driven 
by migrants, and mainly, to meet migrant demands.   
 At the turn of the 20th century, the estimated number 
of UAE nationals was around 80,000; almost all were 
citizens of the region and the population growth rate was 
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slow (Sabban 2002). Over the next sixty years the numbers 
of inhabitants increased by 6,000 and most of them were 
nationals (Faris 1996; Sabban 2002).  But after the first 
exportation of oil, the number of non-nationals in the UAE 
rose by 66,000, accounting for 37 per cent of the total 
population during the year 1968 (Ministry of Planning 1994; 
Sabban 2002).  Only four years after the establishment of 
the UAE federation in 1971, 356,000 foreign workers were in 
the country, representing an average of 64 per cent of the 
total population (Sabban 2002).  At present, the non-
nationals comprise more than 80 per cent of the population 
(Ministry of Planning 2005; Al-Abed, Vine, and Hellyer 
2005), a percentage unmatched anywhere else in the world, 
except in Qatar. In 2005, with a total labor force of 
2,558,541 men and women, only 214,440 (or 9.08 per cent) 
were nationals. For this total of 9.08 per cent, 7.90 per 
cent were men, with the remaining 1.18 being women 
(Ministry of Planning 2005). 
Table 3 shows the continuous decrease of nationals’ 
participation in the workforce. 
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Table 3.  Changes in Workforce Participation in UAE by Gender and by
          Nationality, 1975-2005 
Work Force 1997 1985 1995 2005 
 N %    N % N % N %
 
Total 293,788 100.00 683,825 100.00 1,335,894 100.00 2,558,541 100.0
0 
 
Women 9,803       
        
        
        
       
3.34 65,415 9.57 155,790 11.66 344,748 13.47
 
Men 283,985 96.66 618,410 90.43 1,180,104 88.34 2,123,563 83.00
 
Nationals 44,631 15.19 68,319 9.99 121,291 9.08 214,440 8.38
 
National Women 1,086 0.37 3,997 0.58 15,729 1.18 46,656 1.82
 
National Men 43,545 14.82 64,322 9.41 105,562 7.90 167,784 6.56
 
Expatriates 249,157 84.81 615,506 90.01 1,214,603 90.92 2,344,101 91.62
 
Expatriate Women 8,717 2.97 61,418 8.98 140,061 10.48 298,322 11.66
 
Expatriate Men 240,440 81.84 554,088 81.03 1,074,542 80.44 2,045,779 79.96
 
Source: Ministry of Planning 
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The UAE, indeed, is not the only country in the region 
which suffers from a demographic imbalance between 
nationals and foreign workers. In 2005, non-nationals 
ranged from 24 to 26 per cent of the total population in 
Oman and Saudi Arabia, and to 62 and 78 per cent in Kuwait 
and Qatar, according to data from the Department of 
Economics and Social Affairs of the United Nations. 
According to the data and recommendations of the 2006 Human 
Development Report on the State of Qatar, the small number 
of Qatari nationals, only around 20 per cent of the total 
population of 744,000, cannot meet the growing labor 
requirements of Qatar's booming economy. This factor, along 
with a decline in the fertility rate of nationals, may lead 
to a growing imbalance by 2015, when the forecasted 
population will reach 1.3 million (Bibbo 2007). In Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, foreigners constitute at least 60 per cent 
of the workforce (Kapiszewski 2001). As estimated by 
Kapiszewski this means that there are five working 
foreigners for each working national in Kuwait and Qatar, 
and nine-to-one in the UAE. 
In the GCC countries, one of the major demographic 
characteristics of their population structures is that the 
populations are quite young.  When the oil baby boomers of 
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the mid-1970s entering the labor market in the late 1990s, 
the share of young (less than 15) in the population will 
fall and the supply of the national labor force will grow 
faster than the population (Girgis 2002). “More 
specifically, according to the UN population projections, 
the unweighted GCC average of relative share of the 0-14 
years group will decline gradually and steadily over the 
years from 39.7 per cent in 1975, to 33.7 per cent in 2005, 
and to 28.8 per cent in 2025. It follows then that the 
share of the labor force will increase from 58 per cent in 
1975 to 63 percent in 2005, and so will the number of 
nationals searching for jobs” (Girgis 2002: 8).   
Indeed, the relatively large proportion of young 
people represents a demographic time bomb of considerable 
force. Thus, suitable employment must be found for these 
cohorts of increasing size when they eventually enter the 
labor market. Because most, if not all, of these young 
cohorts will likely be searching for governmental jobs, as 
their parents did, a policy of providing government 
employment may result simply in the growth of the 
government sector rather than substituting national workers 
for foreign workers (Girgis 2002).   
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THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE UAE  
The UAE has undergone rapid socioeconomic development 
in the last few decades, resulting in important changes in 
sociodemographic patterns. The normative system in the UAE 
is structured around the family and is linked to 
traditional and religious teachings that consider family 
formation as a basic function of the society. The family is 
the unit in which reproduction is authorized and is 
expected to occur through marriage. Marriage and 
establishing a family are treated as essential and sacred. 
Marriage without children is considered to be an incomplete 
state (Alnuaimi 2001). In the past, the main and the most 
important role of women was to bear and raise children. 
Today, this role is still crucial, but has been modified 
somewhat given the increasing participation of women in 
higher education and in the paid labor force. 
As in most Arab Islamic societies, UAE women 
traditionally had their own separate sphere.  Socialization 
in gender roles was clearly divided, with women taking 
their roles inside the household and men holding the power 
inside and outside the household (Sabban 2002). Prior to 
the oil era, this division between private and public 
spheres was very obvious. Nowadays, the division is 
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lessened. Today women increasingly participate in the 
workplace and share the public sphere with men (Sabban 
2002).  
The overall level of illiteracy in the UAE has fallen 
from 44 per cent in 1975 to 20 percent in 1995 to 9.3 per 
cent in 2005 (Ministry of Planning 2005). According to the 
1995 UN Development Report, the United Arab Emirates has 
the highest level of female literacy in the Arab World 
(Sabban 2002). Also according to the UAE Ministry of 
Planning, 12 per cent of Emarati women in 2005 are in the 
paid labor force, compared to 5.4 per cent in 1995, two per 
cent in 1985, and one per cent in 1975. More than half of 
the employed Emarati women working outside the home (53 per 
cent) are found in professional work, mainly as teachers in 
girl’s schools (Ministry of Planning 2005). The 
unemployment rate is estimated to be twice that of men, 
i.e., 19.7% for women and 8.2% for men (Tanmia 2005). 
 These increases in levels of education and labor force 
participation have led to an increased age at first 
marriage. Only thirty-three years ago in the UAE, the age 
at first marriage for women was 18 years. By the end of the 
1990s it had increased to 23.1 (Tabutin and Schoumaker 
2005). This increase in the age at first marriage of women 
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has led to a reduction in the difference in mean age 
between spouses at marriage; it was 7.9 years in 1975, but 
dropped to 2.5 in 1998 (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005) 
Non-marriage is considered to be a major social 
problem in the UAE. Men and women expect a woman to be both 
a wife and a mother. A woman is expected to combine these 
two key roles with her role in the labor force, if she is 
employed outside the home. Labor force participation is not 
seen as an alternative to a woman’s roles as wife and 
mother.  
Divorce is also considered to be a social problem. 
Despite the fact that Islam and the UAE culture both 
discourage divorce, the divorce rate has indeed been 
increasing. There is a growing general belief among some in 
the UAE that women’s education and work, as well as the 
adoption of Western values, are among the many reasons for 
the rise in divorce rates in the UAE. It is thought that 
with increasing levels of education and labor force 
participation, women attain a degree of autonomy and become 
less dependent on men. Women who are divorced carry a 
stigma, but men do not.   
Polygyny in Arab Muslim societies has declined in 
recent years (Chamie 1985; Farques 1997; Tabutin and 
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Schoumaker 2005), but has increased slightly in the Arab 
Gulf societies. Chamie (1985) has argued that the 
increasing trends in the proportions of women in polygynous 
marriages among Arab Gulf Muslims does not necessarily 
result from differences in age structure, residence 
(urban/rural) composition, or educational attainment. 
Instead, he argues, that polygyny may be a transitional 
phenomenon occurring in some of these oil-producing 
societies because, despite the great economic 
transformations, the societies are still relatively 
traditional. As the social development of these countries 
becomes more consistent with their economic development, 
polygyny is likely to decline (Chamie 1985).   
Some have argued that this escalated trend in polygyny 
in Gulf countries in past decades was due in large part to 
the increasing wealth of men. Studies have shown that the 
intensity of polygyny is greater among wealthy men, not 
only because they are more likely to take additional wives, 
but also because their wives are less likely to divorce 
them (Timmaeus and Reynar 1998; Ohadike 1968). As we have 
already noted, divorce in the UAE and in the other Gulf 
countries is considered to be shameful and is disdained, 
and divorced women are stigmatized and are less likely than 
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single women to be able to marry. Therefore, being wives of 
polygynists is more socially and economically acceptable 
than being divorced women. 
Although polygyny has increased slightly in the UAE 
and in other Gulf countries in recent years, there are good 
reasons to expect it to decline in future years. However, 
there is a new phenomenon in the UAE and in other Gulf 
societies that might counter the expected polygyny decline. 
We refer to the increasing numbers of women who remain 
single into their twenties and thirties. Women who have 
achieved a high level of education, and remained single 
into their twenties or later to do so, might well have 
acquired a strong preference for a monogamous marriage. But 
their older age and their increased levels of education 
could very well make them less attractive as prospective 
wives for single men. Thus they may be unable to realize 
their preference for a monogamous marriage and hence accept 
a proposal from a polygynist (Timmaeus and Reynar 1998). 
Moreover, since most young single women tend to be more 
attractive brides than divorcees, widows, and women who 
remain single until an older age, these young single women 
are more likely to become higher-order wives than first 
partners, especially when they see their older sisters 
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approaching their thirties while still single. Hence the 
fear of becoming a spinster might well motivate younger 
single women to accept marriage proposals from polygynists. 
HYPOTHESES 
 As a society that values children for their financial 
and emotional supports, especially for the security for 
their old-age parents, I expect that Emarati women in 
polygynous marriages will have slightly higher fertility 
than women in monogamous marriages. There are many reasons 
for this expectation. First, one of the reasons that 
Emarati men marry additional wives is to satisfy their 
desire for a large number of children. Therefore, marrying 
more than one wife will assist him in meeting this goal. 
Second, Emarati men are financially better-off and can 
provide the financial costs of having more than one wife, 
such as housing, and the outlay for each wife and her 
children. In addition to that, polygynist Emarati men tend 
to have less education than their monogamous counterparts. 
To illustrate, the study population of this dissertation 
shows that the husbands of polygynous wives have a lower 
mean level of education (4.99 years) than the husbands of 
monogamous wives (8.80 years.); this might positively 
affect their wives’ fertility.   Third, one of the main 
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proximate determinants of fertility, according to Bongaarts 
(1975), is postpartum infecundability (the period after a 
birth without ovulation). Its length is determined 
primarily by the duration and intensity of breastfeeding or 
sexual abstinence. To illustrate, the duration and 
intensity of breastfeeding should affect the likelihood of 
ovulation. Thus breastfeeding could well lead to a 
substantially longer period without ovulation than the 
typical 1.5 to 2-month interval that is experienced by 
women who do not breastfeed their children (Leridon 1977). 
Also, if women exclusively breastfeed their children for a 
long period, they will have a significantly lower chance of 
ovulating than women who supplement breast-feeding with 
other food (Morgan and Hagewen 2005). Therefore, they will 
be more likely to have lower fertility levels.  The overall 
duration of breastfeeding for Emarati women is to a great 
extent shorter than that of women in other societies, such 
as the African societies in which the duration of 
breastfeeding may last as long as three years.  According 
to Musaiger (1992), the mean duration of breastfeeding for 
UAE women is 8.1 months: 6.7 for employed women and 8.3 for 
unemployed women (see also Musaiger 1995). Finally, unlike 
other societies, Emarati women do not have a long period of 
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postnatal sexual abstinence, which, according to Bongaarts 
(1975), might also determine their fertility levels. Unlike 
some women in other societies where intercourse during 
pregnancy and the postpartum period is frequently forbidden 
by customs and taboos, Emarati women usually do not have 
such customs and taboos. The sexual abstinence for Emarati 
women usually does not exceed 40 days from the birth of a 
child.  
Therefore, I put forth the following hypotheses that 
will be tested in later chapters of this dissertation.  
H1 – Women in polygynous marriages will have slightly higher 
fertility than women in monogamous marriages. Thus, 
polygynous women will have higher fertility than monogamous 
women (Demand for Progeny Model). 
H2 – Age of the husband will be negatively related to 
fertility. As the age of husband increases, the fertility 
of woman will decrease (Coital Frequency Model) 
H3 – Being in a co-residence with another wife (or wives) 
should have a positive effect on fertility due to the 
competition factor between wives (Demand for progeny 
Model). 
H4 - Fertility will have a negative association with the 
number of wives in the union. The fertility of the wife 
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will decrease with the number of wives in the union (Coital 
Frequency Model). 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODS 
 In this chapter I will discuss my data and the methods 
I will be using. First, I discuss my data, and then the 
different methods, namely, Logistic Regression and Poisson 
Regression/Negative Binomial Regression. Then I will 
operationalize and discuss the dependent and independent 
variables to be used in each of the regression analyses. 
DATA 
 The main data for the analyses in my dissertation are 
from the National Family Survey for the Characteristics of 
the Native Households conducted in 1998-1999 by the Central 
Department of Statistics in the Ministry of Planning of the 
UAE.  According to the Ministry of Planning (2000) the 
sample was a two-stage, stratified, cluster probability, 
self-weighting, nationally representative sample of 
approximately 4,000 households in 209 primary sampling 
unites (PSUs). The PSUs are defined as villages in the 
rural sector, and as census enumeration areas in the urban 
sector. The sampling frame for the survey was the list of 
citizen household listings obtained in the 1995 population 
census. Before the selection, the PSUs were stratified into 
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six size categories based on the number of citizen 
households per category. The PSUs containing small numbers 
of citizen households were excluded from the frame. In the 
urban sector, 1,617 enumeration areas each containing fewer 
than five citizen households were excluded and 98 villages 
each containing fewer than ten citizen households were 
excluded in the rural sector. Altogether, 1,867 urban 
households (3.7 per cent) and 165 rural households (0.6 per 
cent) were eliminated from survey coverage by this process.   
 The sample was selected in such a way as to achieve a 
self-weighting design, that is, each household has the same 
probability of selection and therefore the same weight, or 
inflation factor. “This was done by selecting the PSUs at 
one rate, varying according to stratum, and the households 
at another, so that the overall probability of selection is 
1 in 20 across all strata. Hence the survey weight will be 
20 for every household selected” (Ministry of Planning 
2000: 227) 
The sample is proportionally distributed among the 
seven emirates comprising the United Arab Emirates as well 
as by urban and rural residence. The survey was designed to 
provide national-level estimates for UAE citizen 
households; to generate data on patterns and determinants 
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of marriage and divorce, spinsterhood, fertility, family 
planning, child mortality, school dropouts and family 
stability (especially parental care and juvenile 
delinquency); and to provide the basis for further research 
as well as analysis of the prevailing problems of the 
citizen families and their determinants in both urban and 
rural areas and for different emirates. 
 To fulfill the objectives of the National Family 
Survey, five sets of questionnaires were designed: 1) 
Household and Living Conditions; 2) Individual 
Questionnaire for ever married women; 3) Delay in Age at 
Marriage; 4) School Drop-out; and 5) Juvenile Delinquency.  
In this dissertation I use data from the second 
individual questionnaire, namely, The Eligible Women 
Questionnaire. This is a representative sample of 4,245 
ever married women aged 15-49. The criteria for eligibility 
in the survey were UAE citizenship, age, and martial 
status. Of these 4,245 ever married women, however, I only 
included the currently married women who are only once 
married. My analysis is thus restricted to around 3,400 
currently married women who were married once. Thus, 
because marital instability (woman’s current marital status 
and the number of marriages she has had) affects her number 
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of live births (Varea, et al. 1996), those women who are 
currently unmarried (divorcees and widows) and those who 
are separated from their husbands are excluded.  
METHODS 
 I now discuss the different methods I use in my 
dissertation. In CHAPTER V, I am using Logistic Regression 
(LR) to estimate the effect of polygyny on the occurrence 
of a birth to a woman during the last 12 months. In CHAPTER 
VI, I am using Negative Binomial Regression (NBR) to 
estimate the effect of polygyny on the number of children 
ever born (CEB) to a woman.  
Logistic Regression  
 In CHAPTER VI, I use Logistic Regression to estimate 
equations predicting the occurrence of a birth in the last 
12 months. Logistic regression is used when the dependent 
variable is dichotomous (i.e., binary), as opposed to 
continuous. Since I incorporate several continuous 
variables in my analysis as independent variables (e.g 
duration of marriage, age at first marriage, etc.), 
logistic regression permits the estimation of probabilities 
in models containing continuous and/or categorical 
independent variable. 
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 The logistic regression converts the dependent 
variable into a logit, or the natural logarithm of the odds 
of success. Thus, logistic regression estimates the 
probability of a certain event occurring, such as the logit 
of having a birth in the last 12 months, according to the 
following equation: 
nXnb.....2X2b1X1bap1
pln ++++=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−  
where, 
ln(p/1-p), is the logit, or the log odds of that the women 
had a birth in the last 12 months. 
x1 to  are her characteristics; and  and bnX a 1 through bn 
are the logit intercept and regression coefficients. 
 In my analysis of the first dependent variable, 
namely, the occurrence of a birth in the last 12 months, 
the variable assumes the value of 1, or yes, if a woman had 
a birth in the last 12 months prior to the survey date; and 
a value of 0, or no, if a woman did not have a birth in the 
last 12 months prior to the survey date. The mean is the 
proportion of times that the dependent variable receives 
the value of 1, that is, giving birth in the last 12 
months. 
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Negative Binomial Regression and Poisson Regression  
 
 In CHAPTER VII, I use Negative Binomial Regression 
and/or Poisson regression to estimate regression models of 
children ever born. Both Poisson Regression and Negative 
Binomial Regression are used when the dependent variable is 
a count variable, that is, a non-negative, integer, such as 
the number of children ever born. Linear regression models 
do not work well for count variables unless the 
distribution is independently and identically distributed. 
Otherwise OLS models can lead to “inefficient, 
inconsistent, and biased estimates” (Long and Freese 2003: 
245). 
 Negative Binomial regression is preferred over Poisson 
regression when there is overdispersion of the dependent 
variable, that is, the variance is significantly greater 
than the mean. The model is reduced to the Poisson 
Regression when there is not a sufficient amount of 
overdispersion, which is determined by the magnitude of the 
alpha coefficient (Long and Freese 2003). 
 The Poisson regression model is preferred when the 
mean and variance of the count is equal or near equal. The 
Poisson regression model incorporates observed 
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heterogeneity according to the following structural 
equation: 
)kbkiX...2b2iX1b1iX(aexpiµ ++++=  
where: 
µ i is the expected number of children ever born to the ith 
woman. 
x1i to xki   are her characteristics; and  and ba 1 through 
bk are the Poisson intercept and regression coefficients. 
I also examine the distribution of children ever born 
(CEB). If there is an over-representation of women who have 
zero children, I will adjust the Poisson regression model 
and Negative Binomial regression model with Zero-inflated 
models. 
 Next, I describe my dependent and independent 
variables and discuss the operationlization and 
distribution. 
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Each of my chapters uses slightly different 
independent variables, so I will first discuss the 
dependent and independent variables for CHAPTER VI and then 
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discuss the dependent and independent variables for CHAPTER 
VII.  
Chapter VI Variables 
 In CHAPTER VI, I examine the occurrence of a birth in 
the last 12 months and polygyny. The occurrence of a birth 
in the last 12 months is the dependent variable and 
polygyny is the main independent variable. My data show 
that of the 3,402 currently married women who are only once 
married, there are 858 women who have had a birth during 
the last year (around 25 per cent).  
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all 
Emarati women for the occurrence of a birth in the last 12 
months. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for 
monogamous women, and Table 6 presents descriptive 
statistics for polygynous women.  
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Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics of All Married Emarati 
          Women for Occurrence of a Birth in the Last Year, 
          1999 
N=3,402 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev.
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Woman had a Birth 
in the Last Year 
(yes=1) 
 
0.252 
 
0.434 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Polygyny (yes=1) 
 
0.118 
 
0.323 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Husband’s Age 
 
39.581 
 
12.555 
 
16 
 
90 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 
 
18.158 
 
3.944 
 
12 
 
40 
 
Age at Menarche 
 
13.036 
 
1.193 
 
9 
 
16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
0.979 
 
0.144 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Woman’s Education 
(in years) 
 
7.994 
 
6.167 
 
0 
 
21 
 
Employed Woman 
(yes=1) 
 
0.145 
 
0.352 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
0.677 
 
0.468 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
Ever Used  
Contraceptives 
(yes=1) 
 
0.591 
 
0.492 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Husband’s Education 
(in years) 
 
8.352 
 
6.280 
 
0 
 
22 
 
Number of wives in 
the Uniona
1.150 0.424 0 1 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
a This variable includes the number of wives in the union a husband had 
at the time of marriage to the woman (the study participant), including 
her. It includes monogamous and polygynous wives at the time of 
marriage. 
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics of Monogamous Emarati 
          Women for Occurrence of a Birth in the Last Year, 
          1999 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std.Dev.
 
 
Minimum 
 
 
Maximum 
Woman had a Birth 
in the Last Year 
(yes=1) 
 
0.256 
 
0.437 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Husband’s Age 
 
38.246 
 
11.975 
 
16 
 
90 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 
 
18.170 
 
3.852 
 
12 
 
40 
 
Age at Menarche 
 
13.039 
 
1.191 
 
9 
 
16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
0.982 
 
0.132 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Woman’s Education (in 
years) 
 
8.402 
 
6.109 
 
0 
 
21 
 
Employed Woman (yes=1) 
 
0.152 
 
0.359 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
0.691 
 
0.4623 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Ever Used 
Contraceptives (yes=1) 
 
0.597 
 
0.491 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Husband’s Education 
(in years) 
 
8.801 
 
6.230 
 
0 
 
22 
Number of wives in the 
Uniona
1.067 0.286 1 4 
N=3,001 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
a This variable includes the number of wives in the union a husband had 
at the time of marriage to the woman (the study participant), including 
her. It includes monogamous and polygynous wives at the time of 
marriage. 
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Polygynous Emarati 
          Women for Occurrence of a Birth in the Last Year, 
          1999 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Woman had a Birth 
in the Last Year 
(yes=1) 
0.222 0.416 0 1 
Husband’s Age 49.574 12.295 22 90 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 18.070 4.577 12 36 
 
Age at Menarche 13.015 1.208 9 16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
0.953 0.213 0 1 
 
Woman’s Education 
(in years) 
4.940 5.725 0 20 
 
Employed Woman 
(yes=1) 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
0.092 0.290 0 1 
0.574 0.495 0 1 
 
Ever Used 
Contraceptives 
(yes=1) 
 
0.541 0.499 0 1 
Husband’s Education 
(in years) 
4.990 5.602 0 21 
 
Co-residence with 
another wife( or 
wives) (yes=1) 
 
Number of wives in 
the union 
0.392 0.489 0 1 
1.771 0.691 1 4 
N=401 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
 
Around 25 per cent of the women in my sample had a 
birth in the last months. My main independent variable is a 
dummy variable, whether or not the woman is in a polygynous 
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marriage (yes=1). The survey asks “Does your husband 
currently have another wife, that is, other than you?” 
Based on this question, I am defining women in polygynous 
unions as women who answered yes to the question. In my 
data, 401 (around 12 per cent) of all married Emarati women 
are currently married to polygynists. 
 The other independent variables are included to 
control for relevant demographic and social factors.  
 The mean “Husband’s Age” for Emarati women is 39.58 
years with a minimum of 16 years and a maximum of 90 years. 
It has the same minimum and maximum rage for monogamous 
wives, but a smaller range for the husbands of polygynous 
wives (22 to 90). The data also show that polygynists are 
about 11 years older than their monogamist counterparts 
(49.57 and 38.25 years, respectively).  
  The “Age at first marriage” variable shows that all 
Emarati women, on average, marry at age 18.15; and this is 
quite similar for monogamous wives and polygynous wives 
(18.17 and 18.07 respectively). 
 “Age at menarche” is the age in years when the woman 
experienced her first menstrual cycle. It is thought to 
signal the time when a female becomes capable of 
reproduction. It has been shown that age at menarche had a 
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direct or indirect significant effect on women’s fertility 
(Udry 1979; Zelnick 1981; McKibben 2003). For Emarati 
women, the age at menarche is, on average, 13.04, with a 
very slight difference between polygynous and monogamous 
wives (13.02 and 13.04 receptively). 
Most Emarati women have agreed to marry their 
husbands, that is, they have accepted to marry the men who 
have proposed the marriage, or the men who have been 
assigned or arranged to them to marry. The “Marriage 
acceptance” variable shows that among all Emarati women 
97.88 per cent, on average, have agreed to marry their 
husbands, with relatively larger percentage for monogamous 
wives (98.23 per cent) than for polygynous wives (95.26 per 
cent). It is important to mention here that traditionally, 
Emarati woman usually has the right to accept or reject the 
marriage proposal submitted to her father (or to an 
entrusted representative, in the case of her father’s 
death), but it is not acceptable for her to propose the 
marriage mate. 
The “education” variable measures the years of 
completed education the woman has at the date of the 
survey. Emarati woman have a mean of 7.99 years of 
education. This has a range of 0 to 21 years of education, 
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with monogamous wives having a much higher mean (8.10 
years) than polygynous wives (4.94). 
The “employment” variable is thought to have 
influential effects on woman’s fertility. This is a dummy 
variable coded yes if a woman worked at a job for money. On 
average, more than fourteen per cent of Emarati women are 
working at a paid job. This percentage varies quite a bit 
between monogamous wives (15.23 per cent) and polygynous 
wives (9.23 per cent). 
“Urban Residence” controls for whether a woman lives 
in an urban or a rural area (urban=1). On average, sixty-
eight per cent of the Emarati women are urban residents. 
About 70 per cent of monogamous and 58 per cent of 
polygynous wives are urban residents. 
“Ever used contraceptives” controls for whether the 
woman has ever used any method of birth control in the 
past. On average, about 59 per cent of Emarati women have 
used a birth control method, with higher percentage for 
monogamous wives (60 per cent) than for polygynous wives 
(54 per cent). 
“Husband’s Education” refers to the years of completed 
education the woman’s husband has to the date of the 
survey. Emarati husbands have a mean of 8.35 years of 
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education. This has a range of 0 to 22 years, with 
monogamous wives’ husbands having a higher mean (8.80 
years) than polygynous wives’ husbands (4.99). This shows 
that Emarati men have a slightly more education than their 
wives (8.35 for men compared to 7.99 for their wives); the 
means are more similar between men and their polygynous 
wives (4.99 and 4.94 respectively) than between men and 
their monogamous wives (8.80 and 8.40 respectively). 
The “Co-residence with another wife (or wives)” 
variable controls for whether the polygynous wife is living 
with another wife (or wives) in the residence (yes=1). 
About 40 per cent of polygynous wives say that they are 
living with another wife (or wives) in the same residence. 
 “Number of wives in the union” variable controls for 
the number of wives in the union at the time of marriage.  
In my data, more than 87 per cent of Emarati women are 
living in a one-wife union at the time of marriage, 10.70 
per cent are in a two-wives union, 1.65 per cent are in a 
three-wives union, and 0.32 per cent are in a four-wives 
union. 
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I wanted to include other relevant control variables 
in my analyses such as age difference between spouses, 
duration of marriage, and the current number of wives in 
the union, but due to high multicollinearity of these 
variables and the other variables in my analyses, I had to 
remove them. 
Chapter VII  
 The dependent variable for CHAPTER VII is the number 
of children ever born for Emarati women. As in the previous 
section, “Polygyny” is the main independent variable. Table 
7 presents the descriptive statistics for all married 
Emarati women, Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for 
monogamous women, and Table 9 presents descriptive 
statistics for polygynous women.  
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Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics of All Married Emarati 
          Women for Children Ever Born, 1999 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Children Ever Born 
 
4.909 
 
3.632 
 
0 
 
19 
 
Polygyny (yes=1) 
 
0.118 
 
0.323 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Husband’s Age 
 
 
39.581 
 
12.555 
 
16 
 
90 
Age at 1st Marriage  
18.158 
 
3.944 
 
12 
 
40 
 
Age at Menarche 
 
13.036 
 
1.193 
 
9 
 
16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
0.979 
 
0.144 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
0.677 
 
0.468 
 
0 
 
1 
Number of Wives in 
the Uniona
1.150 0.424 1 4 
N=3,402 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
a This variable includes the number of wives in the union a husband had 
at the time of marriage to the woman (the study participant), including 
her. It includes monogamous and polygynous wives at the time of 
marriage. 
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Table 8.  Descriptive Statistics of Monogamous Emarati 
          Women for Children Ever Born, 1999 
 
Variable         
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Children Ever Born 
 
4.784 
 
3.586 
 
0 
 
19 
 
Husband’s Age 
 
38.246 
 
11.975 
 
16 
 
90 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 
 
18.170 
 
3.852 
 
12 
 
40 
 
Age at Menarche 
 
13.039 
 
1.191 
 
9 
 
16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
0.982 
 
0.132 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
0.691 
 
0.462 
 
0 
 
1 
Number of Wives in 
the Uniona
1.067 0.286 1 4 
N=3,001 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
a This variable includes the number of wives in the union a husband had 
at the time of marriage to the woman (the study participant), including 
her. It includes monogamous and polygynous wives at the time of 
marriage. 
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Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics of Polygynous Emarati 
          Women for Children Ever Born, 1999 
 
Variable         
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Children Ever Born 
 
5.843 
 
3.832 
 
0 
 
18 
 
Husband’s Age 
 
49.574 
 
12.295 
 
22 
 
90 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 
 
18.069 
 
4.577 
 
12 
 
36 
 
Age at Menarche 
 
13.015 
 
1.208 
 
9 
 
16 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
0.953 
 
0.213 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
0.574 
 
0.495 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Number of wives in 
the union 
 
1.771 
 
0.691 
 
1 
 
4 
N=401 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
 
The NFS data show that from the 3,402 married women, 
the average number of children ever born to married Emarati 
women is 4.91. It is higher for women in polygynous 
marriage (5.84) than for women in monogamous marriage 
(4.78). 
  As in the previous section, the major independent 
variable is polygyny, that is, whether a woman in 
polygynous marriage (polygyny=1). The only difference in 
this section is that I exclude some variables because they 
occurred, or could have occurred, after the determination 
  
  87
of the last child born in the CEB dependent variable. Thus, 
in CHAPTER VII I am not be able to use woman’s education, 
her employment status, her husband’s education, whether she 
has ever used contraceptives, and whether she lives in a 
same residence with another wife (or wives) variables. 
Consider the hypothetical case that some women may have had 
all their children long ago before they graduated from 
college, the value of the education variable reported in 
the survey. Similar statements may be made with regard to 
husband’s education, woman’s employment, whether she has 
ever used contraceptives, and whether she lives in a same 
residence with another wife (or wives).   
 The descriptive statistics for the variables in this 
section, namely, their means, standard deviations, 
minimums, and maximums are similar to the descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the previous section. Thus, 
polygyny, husband’s age, age at first marriage, age at 
menarche, marriage acceptance, urban residence,  and number 
of wives in the union all have the same descriptive 
statistics as in the previous section.  
In this chapter Negative Binomial Regression will be 
used because the CEB has evidence of overdispersion. The 
alpha coefficient is significant, which indicates that 
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there is a significant amount of overdispersion and 
negative binomial regression is appropriate (Long and 
Freese 2003). The negative binomial model is preferred when 
variance of the count variable is larger than the mean, 
which is the case in my dependent variable (CEB).  Thus the 
data show that the Emarati married women have a mean of 
4.91 children ever born, with a range of 0 to 19, and a 
variance of 13.18. 
 I have plotted the Univariate Poisson distributions 
for the CEB for Emarati women. To compare the observed 
distribution and the Univariate Poisson distribution with a 
mean of 4.91 for UAE women, see Figure 26 in Appendix B. 
 In the next chapter I will elaborate on the 
characteristics of the population under study, namely, the 
Emarati married women who are only once married.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION UNDER STUDY 
 
In this chapter, I first discuss the characteristics 
of the ever married women in the National Family Survey for 
the Characteristics of the Native Households, 1999 (the 
survey I am using for this study). Then I will discuss the 
characteristics of the specific population under study, 
namely, the characteristics of married Emarati women who 
are only married once. 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EVER MARRIED EMARATI WOMEN  
 As mentioned in the last chapter, the National Family 
Survey for the Characteristics of the Native Households, 
1999 surveyed 4,245 ever married Emarati women, (i.e. 
married, divorced, widowed, and separated aged 15 to 49 
years). The majority  (90 per cent) of the ever married 
women in the reproductive ages are married,  5.4 per cent 
are divorced, 4 per cent are widowed, and less than 1 per 
cent are separated (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  Percentage Distribution of Ever Married
           Emarati Women by Marital Status, 1999
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 Source: National Family Survey for the Characterist ics of the Native Households, 1999
 
 Figure 9 shows that about 20 per cent of the first 
marriages of Emarati women last for 25+ years, 15 per cent 
for 20 to 24 years, 14 per cent for 15 to 19 years, and 19 
per cent for less than five years. 
 
  
  91
Figure 9.  Percentage Distribution of Ever Married Emarati
           Women by Duration of the First Marriage, 1999
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 The survey data also show that most of the Emarati 
women are living in urban areas (63 per cent), compared to 
37 per cent living in rural areas. Also, only 13.3 per cent 
of ever married women are employed.  
The mean age at first marriage for Emarati women is 
low compared to the average ages at first marriage in many 
other countries. It is 18.4 years for urban women and 17.2 
for rural women. Figure 10 shows that as the educational 
attainment level increases, the age at first marriage also 
increases. Thus, it is higher among those with college and 
higher degrees (22.3 years) than among women with less 
education. For example, women with primary education have a 
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mean age of first marriage of 16.9 compared to 18 for women 
with an intermediate education and 19.7 for women with 
secondary education.  Also (not shown in the graph), 
employed women have a higher mean age at first marriage 
(20.7) than unemployed women (17.5).  
  Figure 10.  Percentage Distribution of the Mean
              Age at First Marriage for Ever 
              Married Emarati Women by
              Educational Attainment, 1999
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The survey data also show that in 1999 Emarati women 
had a total fertility rate of 4.2 children; it was much 
higher than the national total fertility rate for the 
entire UAE country, that is, including both Emarati and non 
Emarati women, which was 2.56 for the same year of 1999. 
The TFR is also higher among Emarati women in rural areas 
(4.8 children) than in urban areas (3.8 children) (see 
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Figure 11), among unemployed women (4.6 children) than 
employed women (2.5 children) (see Table 10), and among 
less educated women than the more educated women (see 
Figure 12).  
To illustrate, the TFR is 5.5 for the women who are 
illiterate or literate (can read and write), 4.8 for those 
with primary education, 4.5 for those with intermediate 
education, and 3.5 for those with secondary education or 
higher. 
Figure 11.  Age Specific Fertility Rats for Ever Married Emarati
            Women by Age and by Residence, 1999
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 Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native Households, 1999
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Table 10.  Total Fertility Rates of Ever 
           Married Emarati Women by 
           Employment Status, 1999 
Employment Status TFR 
Employed Women 2.5 
Unemployed Women 4.6 
Total 4.2 
Source: National Family Survey for the 
aracteristics of the Native Households, 1999 Ch
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Percentage Distibution of TFR for Ever Married
            Emarati Women by Educational Attainment, 1999
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Illiterate &
Literate
Primary Intermediate Secondary and
higher
Total
Educational Attainment
To
ta
l 
Fe
rt
il
it
y 
Ra
te
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native Households, 1999
 
Given the importance of knowledge about contraceptive 
methods and their importance in spacing births, the survey 
gathered information about contraceptive use for ever 
married Emarati Women. The majority of the ever married 
Emarati women have heard of contraceptives (96 per cent) 
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and only 55 per cent have had used one or more 
contraceptive methods. Among the modern contraceptives 
(Figure 13), most women (39.3 per cent) have used pills, 
the husbands of 24.3 per cent have used condoms, 22 per 
cent of the women have been sterilized, 18.4 per cent have 
used the IUD, and about 16 per cent have used contraceptive 
injections. Among the traditional contraceptive methods, 
the majority of ever married women (38 per cent) have used 
breastfeeding, 34 per cent have used withdrawal, and 25 per 
cent have used the rhythm method. Also, about 40 per cent 
have used other types of contraceptives without specifying 
these types. 
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Figure 13.  Percentage Distribution of Ever
            Married Emarati Women Who Have Practiced
            Contraception by Contraceptive
            Method,1999
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The survey data also show that among the married women 
in the reproductive ages, only 32 per cent of them are 
currently practicing contraception. In each of the five-
year age groups, Figure 14 shows the percentages of married 
women who are practicing contraception. The figure shows 
that most of those practicing contraception are in age 
groups 30-34 (36 per cent), 35 to 39 (40 per cent), and 40 
to 45 (35 per cent), while the lowest percentage is found 
among women in the age group 15 to 19 (12 per cent). It is 
also higher among urban women (36 per cent) than among 
rural women (27 per cent), among employed women (44 per 
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cent) than among unemployed women (31 per cent), and among 
higher educated women than lower educated women (see Figure 
15). Thus, it is higher for those women with college or 
higher degrees (42.2 per cent) than women with secondary 
and less than college degrees (37 per cent). It is also 
higher than those with primary education (32 per cent).  
Figure 14.  Percentage Distribution of Married Emarati Women
            Whose Practicing Conterception by the Age Group, 
            1999 
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    Figure 15.  Percentage Distribution of Married Emarati
                Women Using Conteraceptives by Educational
                Attainment, 1999
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 Figure 16 shows the percentages of husbands by their 
age and by the number of wives. The data in this figure 
show that the majority of the Emarati men in each five-year 
age group have one wife. However, as the men become older, 
they tend to marry additional wives of higher ranks who are 
usually much younger than the husbands themselves. Also, 
men who live in rural areas have a higher percentage of 
wives of higher ranks than men who live in urban areas 
(Figure 17). Also, those with lower education tend to marry 
additional wives of higher rank than men with higher 
education (Figure 18). 
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Figure 16.  Percentage Distibution of Married Emarati Men by Age
            and by Number of Wives, 1999
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Figure 17.  Percentage Distribution of Emarati Men by Residence
            and by Number of Wives, 1999
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Figure 18.  Percentage Distribution of Married Emarati Men by
            Educational Attainment and by Number of Wives, 1999
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Illitrate Litterate Primary Intermediate Secondary
and less
than collge
College and
higher
Educational Attainment
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
One Wife
Two Wives
Three Wives
Four Wives
 Source: National Family Survey for the Characterist ics of the Native Households, 1999
 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WIVES IN THE CURRENT STUDY  
I now turn to a discussion of the characteristics of 
the wives and their husbands that comprise the actual 
sample of women I analyze in my dissertation research. 
These are currently married women who are only once 
married.  
 Table 11 shows the distribution of wives in all 
unions, monogamous unions, and polygynous unions by the 
various characteristics of interest. The data show that, on 
average, polygynous wives are older (the mean age is 34.67 
years) than monogamous wives (the mean age is 31.65). Also 
their mean age difference with their husbands is more than 
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double (15 years) that of monogamous wives (6.60 years). 
Figure 19 shows the age differences between husbands and 
their wives in a five-year age groups. The data in the 
figure show that, overall, the age difference between a 
husband and his wife is larger in polygynous unions than 
between a husband and his wife in monogamous unions. For 
example, most of the monogamists (more than 40 per cent) 
have an age difference range of 0 to 4 years with their 
wives, while most of the polygynists (around 22 per cent) 
have an age difference range of 5 to 9 years with their 
wives.  
Women in polygynous unions also experience, on 
average, a longer marriage duration (16.48 years) than 
women in monogamous unions (13.24 years).  
Moreover, 54 per cent of polygynous wives said that 
they have used one or more contraceptive methods in the 
past, compared to 60 per cent of monogamous wives. However, 
the majority of polygynous wives, around 94 per cent, said 
they are currently using contraceptives compared to almost 
88 per cent of monogamous wives. The ideal number of 
children is almost the same among wives in both unions. 
Thus, both polygynous and monogamous wives, on average, 
desire a family of around 6 children. 
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The data in Table 11 also show that there are more 
wives in monogamous unions living in a house with in-laws 
than wives in polygynous unions (42 per cent versus 33.42). 
They also have more housekeepers than polygynous wives (72 
and 58 per cent, respectively). There are at least two 
possible explanations for this difference. One, wives in 
monogamous unions have an average education that is almost 
two times higher than that of wives in polygynous unions 
(8.40 compared to 4.94 years, receptively). Accordingly, 
there is a higher percentage of employed wives in 
monogamous unions (15.28 per cent) than in polygynous 
unions (9.22 per cent), which may lead these monogamous 
wives to require assistants to do housework and care for 
the children. Two, some polygynists cannot afford to have 
housekeepers for all of their wives, especially if they 
also provide separate residences for each wife. Thus, among 
the polygynous wives, only 39 per cent are living with 
another wife (or wives) in the same residence, and almost 
60 per cent are living in a separate residence. Therefore, 
it may well be financially difficult for a husband to 
provide a housekeeper for each wife. 
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Table 11.  Distribution of Wives’ Characteristics in All 
           Unions, in Monogamous and Polygynous Unions  
  
Characteristics 
 
All Unions 
 
Monogamous 
Unions 
 
Polygynous 
Unions 
Age groups (%) 
 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
 
 
4.00 
17.93 
20.43 
18.22 
17.08 
14.52 
7.82 
 
 
4.30 
18.99 
21.26 
17.93 
16.36 
13.66 
7.50 
 
 
1.75 
9.98 
14.21 
20.45 
22.44 
20.95 
10.22 
Mean age of wife                32.00 31.65 34.67 
Mean age difference between 
spouses 
7.58 6.60 15.00 
Mean duration of marriage 13.62 13.24 16.48 
Mean education (in years) 7.99 8.40 4.94 
Employed (%) 14.52 15.28 9.22 
Ever used contraceptives (%) 59.05 60.00 54.11 
Currently using 
contraceptives(a)  
88.24 87.55 94.00 
Co_residence with (%): 
A member from in-laws 
A member from wife’s family 
Another wife (or wives) 
A non-relative person 
A housekeepers (males or 
females) 
 
40.65 
12.96 
4.97 
2.53 
70.52 
 
 
41.62 
13.00 
0.40 
2.43 
72.18 
 
33.42 
12.72 
39.15 
3.24 
58.10 
Mean ideal family Size(b) 6.31 6.27 6.62 
 
Number of wives 3,402 3,001 401 
 
(a)  Based on 2,008 women only: 1,791 for monogamous and 217 for 
olygynous womenp (b)Based on 2,983 women only: 2,632 for monogamous and 351 for 
monogamous women. 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
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Figure 19.  Percentage Distribution of Age Difference between
            Husbands and Wives by Type of Union, 1999
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
 -11+  -6 to -10  -1 to -5    0 to 4  5 to 9  10 to 14 15 to 19  20 to 24  25 to 29  30 to 34  35 to 39  40 to 44  45 to 49  50+
Age difference
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge All Unions
Monogamous
UnionsPolygynous
Unions
Age difference= age of husband-age of wife (in years).
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native Households, 1999
 
 
 Table 12 shows the distribution of husbands’ 
characteristics in all unions, monogamous unions, and 
polygynous unions for the various characteristics of 
interest. Polygynists have lower mean years of completed 
education (4.99 years) than monogamists (8.80 years), and a 
lower percentage of them are employed (75 per cent) than 
monogamists (85 per cent); this difference could be 
explained by their older ages, many of them already in 
their retirement ages. In Figure 20 and Figure 21, also, we 
see that as men become older, they marry additional wives. 
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 The data in Table 12 also show that the majority of 
polygynists are married to two wives, and not to more. 
Thus, 82 per cent of them are married to two wives, 12 per 
cent to three wives, and 6.23 per cent to four wives. 
Besides their current Emarati wives (the participants in my 
sample), around 62 per cent of polygynists have another 
Emarati wife, 8.5 per cent have two additional Emarati 
wives, and 6.2 per cent have three additional Emarati 
wives, compared to almost 26 per cent of polygynists who do 
not have an additional Emarati wife. On the other hand, 
almost 29 per cent of polygynists who have an additional 
non-Emarati wife, 4.5 per cent have two additional non-
Emarati wives, and very few (0.25 per cent) have three 
additional non-Emarati wives, compared to 66 per cent of 
polygynists who have no additional non-Emarati wives. 
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Table 12.  Distribution of Husbands’ Characteristics in All 
           Unions, in Monogamous and Polygynous Union 
 
Characteristics 
 
All 
Unions 
 
Monogamous 
Unions 
 
Polygynous 
Unions 
Age groups (%) 
 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60+ 
 
 
.47 
7.44 
17.20 
14.84 
14.76 
11.93 
11.55 
8.00 
5.32 
8.50 
 
 
.53 
8.33 
18.93 
16.06 
15.43 
11.66 
11.23 
6.86 
4.50 
6.46 
 
 
- 
.75 
4.24 
5.74 
9.73 
13.97 
13.97 
16.46 
11.47 
23.69 
Mean education 8.35 8.80 4.99 
Employment status (%) 83.74 84.91 75.06 
The current number of wives (%): 
Two wives 
Three wives 
Four wives 
   
82.04 
11.72 
6.23 
Number of national (Emarati) 
wives (other than the 
participant) (%): 
None 
One wife 
Two wives 
Three wives 
 
 
 
  
 
26.43 
61.85 
8.48 
3.24 
Number of non-national (non-
Emarati) wives (other than the 
participant)(%): 
None 
One wife 
Two wives 
Three wives 
   
 
65.84 
29.43 
4.49 
0.25 
 
Number of husbands 3,402 3,001 401 
Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native 
Households, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  107
Figure 20.  Percentage Distribution of Husbands' Age by  Type of
            Union, 1999
0
5
10
15
20
25
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+
Age group
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge All Unions
Monogamous
Unions
Polygnous
Unions
 Source: National Family Survey for the Characteristics of the Native Households, 1999
 
 
Figure 21.  Percentage Distribution of Emarati Married Men by
            Age and by Current Number of Wives, 1999
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Regarding the employment of the husbands, Figure 22 
also shows that the highest proportions of polygynists are 
in the ‘military’ (27 per cent) and are ‘salesmen and other 
services’ (21 per cent). Relatively lower proportions are 
found among ‘general laborers’ (14 per cent) and 
‘legislators, executives, and managers’ (13 per cent).  In 
contrast, the lowest percentage of polygynously married men 
are found among ‘craftsmen,’ ‘technicians,’ ‘farmers, 
cattlemen, fishermen, and hunters,’ and ‘clericals.’  
Figure 22.  Percentage Distribution of Emarati
            Polygynists by Occupation, 1999
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 The next CHAPTER will report the results of my 
Logistic Regression models for births occurring in the last 
12 months. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE OCCURRENCE OF A BIRTH IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS 
  
 In this chapter, I present and discuss the results of 
Logistic regression models predicting for each woman her 
likelihood of having a baby in the past 12 months. I begin 
the chapter outlining my general expectations I have regard 
to the relationship between polygyny and occurrence of a 
birth in the past 12 months. Here my major prediction is 
that polygynous wives will have higher fertility than 
monogamous wives. I discuss the theoretical rationale for 
my predication in the next section. Then I discuss briefly 
the general issue of logistic regression. Then I present 
and discuss the results of my regression models. 
THEORTICAL RATIONALE 
I expect to observe a positive relationship between 
polygyny and women’s current fertility, that is, her 
likelihood of having a baby in the past 12 months. This 
prediction is based on the Male Demand for Progeny Model 
(as discussed in an earlier chapter), which implies that, 
on average, polygynous wives will have more children than 
monogamous wives. Thus, men marry additional wives mainly 
to satisfy their desire for a large number of children. 
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This desire for children may also create competition among 
wives in polygynous unions to bear more children (Olusanya 
1971; Young 1954)so to be able to meet their husbands’ 
demands for children. However, the fertility of more recent 
wives may be affected by earlier wives saturating both the 
demand for children and the ability to provide for 
offspring. Thus, some studies do indeed show that higher-
order wives tend to have fewer children than lower-order 
wives.  Also, as Anderton and Emigh (1989) argue, “the 
demand for progeny manifests itself more clearly in the 
later life course, where the fertility of earlier marriages 
is largely determined and affects the continuing fertility 
of more recent wives.” (1989:  852)  
A fairly consistent finding in the literature appears 
to be that the relationship between polygyny and fertility 
is negative in many African societies, among the Mormons, 
and in other societies. More precisely, this literature 
reports that higher-order wives have lower fertility than 
lower-order wives. My expectation of the opposite, i.e., a 
positive relationship between polygyny and fertility in 
the UAE is based on many reasons which are not found, to a 
large extent, in many African societies. These reasons are 
social, economic, and biological. 
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I have already discussed these reasons in CHAPTER III, 
and I do so in more detail in this chapter. First, Emarati 
men are financially better-off and can provide the 
financial costs of having more than one wife, including 
housing and outlay for each wife and her children. 
polygynist Emarati men also tend to have less education 
that their monogamous counterparts. Thus, the study 
population of this dissertation shows that the husbands of 
polygynous wives have a lower mean of education (4.99 
years) than the husbands of monogamous wives (8.80 years.); 
this might positively affect their wives’ fertility. 
Second, unlike some women in other societies where 
intercourse during pregnancy and the postpartum period is 
frequently forbidden by customs and taboos, Emarati women 
usually do not have such customs and taboos. The sexual 
abstinence for Emarati women does not exceed 40 days from 
the birth of a child, compared, for example, with Ibadan 
(Nigerian) women who have a mean period of postnatal 
abstinent of around 22 months: 24 months for women in 
polygynous marriages versus 20 months for women in 
monogamous marriages (Ware 1975). Third,  the overall 
duration of breastfeeding for Emarati women is, to a great 
extent, shorter than that of other societies, such as the 
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African societies in which the duration of breastfeeding 
may last as long as three years. Thus, According to 
Musaiger (1992), the mean duration of breastfeeding for UAE 
women is 8.1 months: 6.7 for employed women and 8.3 for 
unemployed women. Fourth, unlike other polygynists in other 
societies, over 83 percent of Emarati polygynists are 
married to no more than two wives. So, Emarati polygynists 
can divide their time among their wives and, presumably 
increase sexual competition and increase the risk of 
pregnancy for each wife. Moreover, even if the wives do not 
live in the same residence, which according to the coital 
frequency model should decrease the fertility of each 
woman, the spatial distance between the homes of each wife 
is usually not an issue in the UAE with the modern 
transportation and with the fact that wives are usually 
living within close proximity to one another even if they 
have separate residences.   Fifth, unlike earlier studies 
that have showed a negative impact of polygyny on women’s 
fertility in some Arab societies, the recent studies have 
shown that polygyny has a positive effect on women's 
fertility, such as studies that have been conducted in 
Jordan (Sueyoshi and Ohtsuka 2003) . 
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 My predictions of secondary interest are   1) as the 
age of husband increases, the fertility of the wife will 
decrease; 2) if a wife co-resides with another wife (or 
wives) she will have higher fertility; and 3) the fertility 
of the wife will decrease with the number of wives in the 
union. All my hypotheses are tested controlling for 
numerous biological and social influences. 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS 
The occurrence of a birth for a wife in the last 12 
months is a dichotomous (i.e., binary) variable, scored 1 
if a woman has had a birth in the 12 months preceding the 
date of the survey, and 0 if not. Since I will be 
incorporating several continuous variables in my models as 
independent variables (e.g. duration of marriage, age at 
first marriage, etc.), logistic regression permits the 
estimation of probabilities in models containing continuous 
and/or categorical independent variables. The logistic 
regression model also converts the dependent variable, 
i.e., the occurrence of a birth in the last 12 months, into 
a logit, or the natural logarithm of the odds of success. 
The mean is the proportion of times that the dependent 
variable receives the value of 1, that is, giving birth in 
the last 12 months.  
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I have already reviewed and discussed in CHAPTER IV 
the logistics regression model in more detail, so I will 
not repeat that discussion here. 
The key independent variable is a dummy variable 
scored 1 if the woman is currently married to a polygynist, 
and 0 if not. As previously noted, in my sample of married 
Emarati women, 12 per cent of the women are currently 
married to polygynists. 
RESULTS 
 I include nine models to test the polygyny effect on 
fertility for married Emarati women.  Table 13 presents the 
results of progressively more inclusive logistic regression 
models predicting the log odds of currently once married 
women having had a birth in the past 12 months. I 
exponentiated the logistic coefficients, so they are 
expressed as odds ratios. Model 1 includes only the 
polygyny dummy variable, scored 1 if the woman is currently 
in a polygynous marriage. As seen in Model 1, the odds 
ratio of polygyny variable is not statistically 
significant. There is no difference between polygynous and 
monogamous women in the odds ratios of having a birth in 
the past 12 months.  
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 Model 2 adds a second variable to the equation, the 
age of the husband; I expect that this variable should have 
a negative effect on the likelihood of the wife having a 
recent birth; the older the husband, the less the 
likelihood. Most importantly, in the equation in Model 2, 
the polygyny variable now becomes, as predicted, positive 
and is statistically significant. The odds ratio of 1.62 
means that the odds of polygynous wives having had a birth 
in the past 12 months are 62 per cent greater than the odds 
of monogamous wives, controlling for the age of the 
husband. 
 Model 3 adds another independent variable to the 
logistic regression equation, namely, woman’s age at first 
marriage. This variable is added as a control. Even after 
adding woman’s age at first marriage, the polygyny variable 
maintains its positive effect and statistical significance, 
with an odds ratio of 1.60. Polygynous wives have odds of 
having a birth in the past 12 months that are 60 per cent 
greater than the odds of monogamous wives, controlling for 
both husband’s age and wife’s age at first marriage. 
 In Model 4, I added four socioeconomic variables to 
the equation, namely, wife’s completed education, whether 
the wife is employed outside the home, whether the family 
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lives in an urban area, and husband’s completed education. 
Once again, and very importantly, the positive and 
statistically significant effect of the polygyny variable 
is sustained. Its odds ratio is 1.56, which means that 
polygynous wives have odds of having had a baby born to 
them in the past 12 months that are 56 per cent greater 
than the respective odds of monogamous wives, controlling 
for husband’s age, his education, wife’s education, her age 
at marriage, whether she employed outside the home, and 
whether the couple resides in an urban area. 
 When I add a biological variable to the equation in 
Model 5, that is, age at menarche (in years), the magnitude 
of the polygyny variable does not change much. Thus, its 
odds ratio is 1.559, meaning that polygynous wives have 
odds of having had a baby born to them in the past 12 
months that are 56 per cent greater than the respective 
odds of monogamous wives, controlling for husband’s age, 
his education, wife’s education, her age at marriage, 
whether the she works outside the home, her age at 
menarche, and whether the couple resides in an urban area. 
 Moving to Model 6, I added woman’s acceptance of 
marriage as a control variable, that is, whether a woman 
agreed to marry her husband. The magnitude of the polygyny 
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variable hardly changes at all from its value in Model 5. 
Its odds ratio is 1.56, meaning that, as in Model 5, 
polygynous wives have odds of having had a baby born to 
them in the past 12 months that are 56 per cent greater 
than the odds of monogamous wives, holding the other 
variables constant. 
 In Model 7, I added one more independent variable that 
is expected to have an influential effect on woman’s 
fertility, that is, whether a woman has ever used any birth 
control method in the past; this is a dummy variable, coded 
1 if yes. Again, the polygyny variable maintains its 
positive effect and statistical significance, with an odds 
ratio that does not change much from Model 6. 
 Model 8 includes another independent variable that is 
shown to have a significant effect on the fertility of 
polygynous women (Garenne and Van de Walle 1989), that is, 
whether a woman co-resides with another wife (or wives). 
Around 39 per cent of women in my sample do co-reside with 
another wife (or wives). The results in Model 8 show that 
even when controlling for whether a woman co-resides with 
another wife (or wives), the effect and statistical 
significance of the polygyny variable is sustained. 
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 Model 9 is the final model and it includes all the 
previous independent variables along with controls for the 
number of wives in the union. When I control for the number 
of wives in the union, the polygyny variable loses its 
significant positive impact on whether a birth occurred in 
the last 12 months. Thus, the odds of having a birth in the 
last 12 months for polygynous wives are not statistically 
different than the odds of having a birth in the last 12 
months for monogamous wives, controlling for the number of 
wives in the unions and the other previous independent 
variables. 
 The final column of Table 13 presents the semi-
standardized log odds coefficients for Model 9. These semi-
standardized log odds coefficients enable us to compare the 
magnitude of the partial slopes of each variable on the 
dependent variable by standardizing the slope so that each 
coefficient is now based on the same metric. For instance, 
the standardizing of the slopes allows us to see how much 
influence each variable has on woman’s likelihood of having 
a birth in the last 12 months. Husband’s age, indeed, has 
the largest (absolute) influence on the woman’s likelihood 
of having a birth in the last 12 months. Its value of -
0.755 means that a one standard deviation change in 
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husband’s age will result in a 53 per cent decrease in the 
log odds for a woman having a birth in the last 12 months, 
holding constant the effects of the other 11 covariates. 
The second largest influence on the woman’s likelihood of 
having a birth in the last 12 months is the number of wives 
in the union. Thus, its value of 0.182 means that a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of wives in the 
union results in a 20 per cent increase in the log odds of 
a woman having a birth in the last 12 months, holding 
constant the effect of the other 11 covariates.  Viewed 
together, these semi-standardized log odds coefficients 
indicate that the most influential covariates on the 
woman’s likelihood of having a birth in the last 12 months 
after age of the husband and the number of wives in the 
union are:  third, woman’s work outside home (-0.107); 
fourth, age at first marriage (0.106); and fifth, wife’s 
education (0.073). The analysis surprisingly shows that 
being in co-residence with another wife (or wives) has no 
effect on the current fertility of women. 
 At the bottom of the table I report values for each 
model of Pseduo R2 and its log likelihood. Both statistics 
provide information about how well the data fit the model.  
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Table 13.  Logistic Regression Models of the Effect of 
           Currently Being in a Polygynous Union, versus in 
           a Monogamous Union, On the Log Odds of Having a 
           Child in the Last 12 Months for the Emarati 
           Married Women, 1999 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Polygynous Union 
(yes=1) 
 0.828  
(0.105) 
 1.620* 
(0.227) 
 1.596* 
(0.224) 
 1.557* 
(0.220) 
  1.559* 
(0.221) 
 1.564* 
(0.221) 
Age of Husband    0.941* 
(0.004) 
 0.943* 
(0.004) 
 0.945* 
(0.005) 
 0.945* 
(0.005) 
 0.945* 
(0.005) 
 
Age at 1st 
Marriage 
   1.024* 
(0.011) 
 1.032* 
(0.013) 
 1.033* 
(0.013) 
 1.032* 
(0.013) 
 
Woman’s 
completed 
Education (in 
years) 
 
    1.013 
(0.010) 
 1.013 
(0.010) 
 1.013 
(0.010) 
 
Employed Woman 
Outside Home 
(yes=1) 
 
    0.721* 
(0.096) 
 0.721* 
(0.096) 
 0.720* 
(0.096) 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
    0.881 
(0.081) 
 0.875 
(0.080) 
 0.872 
(0.080) 
 
Husband’s 
Completed 
Education 
 
Age at Menarche 
(in years) 
    0.996 
(0.008) 
 0.996 
(0.008) 
 0.996 
(0.008) 
 
     0.974 
(0.034) 
 0.974 
(0.034) 
 
Marriage 
Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
      1.267 
(0.423) 
 
Ever Used 
Contraceptives 
(yes=1) 
 
      
 
 
Co-residence 
with another 
wife( or wives) 
(yes=1) 
      
 
 
 
Number of Wives 
in the union 
      
 
 
Pseduo R2 0.001 0.067 0.0684 0.0706 0.0707 0.0709 
L
 
og Likelihood -1920.1 -1792.4 -1789.9 -1785.6 -1785.3 -1785.1 
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Table 13.  Continued 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard error 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Semi-
Standardized Log 
Odds 
Coefficient** 
Polygynous Union 
(yes=1) 
1.562* 
(0.221) 
1.531* 
(0.256) 
1.208 
(0.221) 
0.061 
Age of Husband 0.945* 
(0.005) 
0.945* 
(0.005) 
0.942* 
(0.005) 
-0.755 
 
 
Age at 1st Marriage 
 
 
1.032* 
(0.013) 
1.031* 
(0.128) 
1.027* 
(0.013) 
0.106 
 
 
Woman’s completed 
Education (in years) 
 
 1.013 
(0.010) 
1.013 
(0.010) 
1.012 
(0.010) 
0.073 
 
 
Employed Woman 
Outside Home (yes=1) 
 
0.720* 
(0.097) 
0.721* 
(0.097) 
0.737* 
(0.099) 
-0.107 
 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
Husband’s Completed 
Education 
 0.873 
(0.008) 
0.874 
(0.080) 
0.881 
(0.082) 
-0.059 
 
 
 
Age at Menarche (in 
years) 
0.996 
(0.008) 
0.996 
(0.008) 
0.998 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
 
 
 
 0.974 
(0.034) 
0.974 
(0.034) 
0.976 
(0.034) 
 
-0.029 
 
 
Marriage Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
 
Ever Used 
1.267 
(0.422) 
1.264 
(0.422) 
1.294 
(0.432) 
0.037 
 
 
Contraceptives 
(yes=1) 
 
 0.982 
 0.084 
0.983 
(0.084) 
0.989 
(0.085) 
-0.006 
 
 
 
Co-residence with 
other wife( or 
wives) (yes=1) 
 
 1.058 
(0.262) 
1.001 
(0.250) 
0.000 
 
 
 
Number of Wives in 
the union 
  
 
1.536* 
(0.193) 
0.182 
 
Pseduo R2 0.0709 0.0709 0.0738  
 
Log Likelihood -1785.1 -1785.0 -1779.4  
* p<0.05 
**Semi-standardized log odds coefficients apply only to Model 9  
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DISCUSSION 
 In the first 8 models, after controlling for the 
numerous biological and social variables, the polygyny 
variable is significant and positive in predicting current 
fertility, that is, the likelihood of the occurrence of a 
birth in the last 12 months. This is consistent with my 
hypothesis that polygyny has a significant positive effect 
on woman’s fertility. However, the final model shows that 
when controlling for the number of wives in the union, the 
polygyny variable has no significant positive effect on 
woman’s current fertility. In addition, in this last model, 
even though the polygynous union variable is not 
statistically significant, its semi-standardized 
coefficient is still greater than some of the biological 
social factors such as husband’s education, age at 
menarche, residing in urban area, agreed to marry the 
husband, using contraceptives in the past, and co-residing 
with another wife (or wives). 
 For my other three hypotheses, namely, my prediction 
of the negative effect of husband’s age, the positive 
effect of a wife being in co-residence with another wife 
(or wives), and the negative effect of the number of wives 
in the union, on the likelihood of occurrence of a birth in 
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the last 12 months, only the husband’s age variable has a 
statistically significant effect in the predicted 
direction. For instance, as expected, Model 9 shows that 
when the husband’s age increases by one year, the 
probability of occurrence of a birth in the last 12 months 
decreases by 6 per cent, controlling for the other 
variables. 
However, Model 9 indicates that my third hypothesis, 
namely that co-residing with another wife (or wives) should 
have a positive effect on woman’s current fertility, is not 
confirmed. Thus Model 9 shows that co-residing of a wife 
with another wife (or wives) has the same expected 
direction (positive), but this effect is not significant on 
predicting the probability of a wife having a birth in the 
last 12 months, controlling for the other variables.  
Also, Model 9 shows that my fourth hypothesis, namely 
that as the number of wives in the union increases, wife’s 
fertility will decrease, is not confirmed. Indeed, the 
analysis shows an opposite effect, that is, the fertility 
of the wife will increase with the number of wives in the 
union. For instance, when the number of wives of a 
polygynist increases by one wife, the probability of the 
  
  125
occurrence of a birth increases by 54 per cent, controlling 
for the other variables.  
I will discuss some of these results here, and will do 
so more fully in the last chapter of this dissertation. One 
can explain this result in part by referring to the demand 
for progeny theory, which states that men marry additional 
wives mainly to satisfy their desire for a large number of 
progeny (Muhsam 1956; Chojnacka 1980; Ukaegbu 1981). Thus, 
one of the main reasons for men to have multiple marriages 
is to have more children (Blance and Gage 2000).  The 
theory also states, however, that the fertility of more 
recent wives may be affected by a declining demand for 
children as the stock of progeny by earlier wives saturates 
both the demand for children and the ability to provide for 
offspring (Anderton and Emigh 1989).  
Among the Emarati married men, unlike many other 
populations such as those in Africa, the majority of 
polygynists are married to two wives, and not to more. For 
instance, 82 per cent of Emarati men who are polygynists 
are married to two wives, 12 per cent to three wives, and 6 
per cent to four wives. This may well explain why that the 
majority of polygynists can divide their time among their 
wives and, presumably increase sexual competition and 
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increase the risk of pregnancy for each wife; most of them 
have only two wives.  
In addition, even if the wives do not live in the same 
residence, which according to the coital frequency model 
should decrease the fertility of each woman, the spatial 
distance between the homes of each wife is usually not an 
issue in the UAE with the modern transportations and with 
the fact that wives are usually living within close 
proximity to one another even if they have separate 
residences.   
My results also show that wife’s age at marriage and 
working outside the house have a significant influence on 
her current fertility. Thus, as woman’s age at first 
marriage increases, her fertility is shown to increase by 3 
per cent, controlling for the other variables. In contrast, 
working outside the home is shown to decrease women’s 
current fertility by 26 per cent, controlling for the other 
variables. 
 The model also shows that my other variables, namely, 
whether a couple resides in an urban area, the wife’s age 
at menarche, her acceptance to marry her husband, her 
husband’s education, and whether she has ever used 
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contraceptives, do not have any significant effects on her 
current fertility. 
 In the next chapter, I will report the results of the 
effect of polygyny on cumulative fertility. My dependent 
variable will be the number of children ever born (CEB) to 
the woman. Since CEB is a count variable, my regression 
models in the next chapter will be estimated using Negative 
Binomial Regression. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CHILDREN EVER BORN 
 
In this chapter, I present and discuss the results of 
Negative Binomial regression models predicting for each 
woman her number of children ever born (CEB). I begin the 
chapter outlining my general expectations with regard to 
the relationship between polygyny and CEB. As was the case 
in the previous chapter where I expected and reported a 
positive association between polygyny and current fertility 
(whether the woman had a baby in the past 12 months), in 
this chapter I expect also to find a positive association 
between polygyny and CEB. I discuss these theoretical 
issues in the next section. Then I discuss briefly the 
general issue of count regression and some of the 
statistical issues leading to my decision to estimate 
negative binomial models. Then I present and discuss the 
results of my regression models. 
THEORETICAL RATIONALE  
As the case in the previous chapter where I expected 
and reported a positive association between polygyny and 
women’s current fertility, in this chapter I also expect to 
observe a positive association between polygyny and women’s 
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cumulative fertility. My theoretical rationale is based on 
the Male Demand for Progeny Model (as discussed in an 
earlier chapter), which assumes that, on average, 
polygynous wives will have more children than monogamous 
wives. It argues that men marry additional wives mainly to 
satisfy their desire for a large number of progeny. This 
desire for children may also create competition among wives 
in polygynous unions to bear more children (Olusanya 1971; 
Young 1954) so to be able to meet their husbands’ demands 
for children. However, the fertility of more recent wives 
may be affected by earlier wives saturating both the demand 
for children and the ability to provide for offspring. 
Thus, some studies do indeed show that higher-order wives 
tend to have fewer children than lower-order wives.  
A fairly consistent finding in the literature appears 
to be that the relationship between polygyny and fertility 
is negative in many African societies, among the Mormons, 
and in other societies. More precisely, this literature 
reports that higher-order wives have lower fertility than 
lower-order wives. My expectation of the opposite, i.e., a 
positive relationship between polygyny and fertility in 
the UAE is based on many reasons which are not found, to a 
large extent, in many African societies. These reasons are 
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social, economic and biological. I have already reviewed 
and discussed in CHAPTER III and CHAPTER VI these reasons 
so I will not repeat that discussion here. 
COUNT REGRESSION MODELS 
Children ever born is a count variable. Ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) is usually not an appropriate 
method for analyzing a count, unless the count is 
independently and identically distributed. Long and Freese 
(2003) have written that while “the linear regression model 
has often been applied to count outcomes, this can result 
in inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates ... It is 
(thus) much safer to use models specifically designed for 
count outcomes” (2003: 244) 
 Among the many models that are appropriate for 
analyzing counts, the Poisson regression model and the 
Negative Binomial regression model are the principal ones. 
Negative Binomial regression is preferred over Poisson 
regression when there is overdispersion of the dependent 
variable, that is, the variance is significantly greater 
than the mean. It turns out that this is the situation with 
my dependent variable. Indeed when I estimate the full 
model using Negative Binomial regression, I will be able to 
determine statistically if there is evidence of 
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overdispersion in the model. If the alpha coefficient is 
significant, this means that there is a significant amount 
of overdispersion and Negative Binomial is the appropriate 
choice over the Poisson regression (Long and Freese, 2003). 
I have already reviewed and discussed in CHAPTER IV 
these two major count regression models, so I will not 
repeat that discussion here. 
I have estimated Negative Binomial regression models 
of children ever born for married Emarati women and  have 
determined that the Negative Binomial approach is the 
appropriate method. 
RESULTS 
 Like the situation in the previous chapter when I 
estimated the occurrence of a birth in the last 12 months, 
my major prediction here is that polygynous wives will have 
higher CEB than monogamous wives. Some of my predictions of 
secondary interest are similar to that of the previous 
chapter, except that I will not be able to examine in my 
analysis here the predication that if a wife co-resides 
with another wife (or wives), she will have higher 
fertility.  The reason is that the wife’s co-residence 
variable in my data only refers to her current residence, 
that is, whether she is currently living with another wife 
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(or wives), not her past co-residence status. In other 
words, it is not possible to draw inferences from the 
direct comparison of cumulative fertility (i.e. children 
ever born to women) and their co-residence status at the 
time of survey because this may not reflect their residence 
status at the time of their past conceptions. But I will be 
able to examine my other two predictions, namely as the age 
of husband increases, the fertility of the wife will 
decrease; and the fertility of the wife will decrease with 
the number of wives in the union. All these hypotheses are 
tested controlling for numerous biological and social 
influences.  
 I estimate a series of Negative Binomial models that 
examine the direct effect of polygyny and the control 
covariates on number of children ever born to married 
Emarati women. Table 14 presents the results of seven 
nested Negative Binomial models. The first model has only 
one variable, polygyny; the second model includes polygyny 
and age of the husband; the third model includes polygyny, 
age of the husband, and wife’s age at first marriage; the 
fourth model adds to the previous variables whether the 
couple resides in an urban area; the fifth model adds the 
additional variable of whether the wife agreed to be 
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married her husband; the sixth model adds a biological 
variable, wive’s age at menarche, and the last model 
includes all the previous variables along with controls for 
the number of wives in the union. 
 The results in Model 1 show the expected relationship, 
namely that polygyny is significantly associated in a 
positive direction with the number of children ever born; 
the Negative Binomial coefficient is 0.200. If I 
exponentiate the coefficient, I obtain an odds ratio of 
1.221; this means that polygynous wives, on average, have 
22 per cent more children ever born to them than monogamous 
wives. 
 However, once I begin introducing control variables 
into the model, the positive association shown in Model 1 
became negative. Thus, in Model 2 I added age of the 
husband as a second variable. The age of the husband shows 
unexpected positive association. Thus, as the age of the 
husband increases, the number of children ever born to 
their wives decreases. But the more important point is that 
with age of the husband now included in the model, the 
polygyny variable no longer has a positive effect on the 
number of children ever born to women; the relationship is 
now negative and statistically significant.  
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 Model 3 adds another independent variable to the 
Negative Binomial equation, namely, woman’s age at first 
marriage. This variable is added as a control. Even after 
adding woman’s age at first marriage, the polygyny variable 
maintains its negative and statistically significant 
effect.  Being in a polygynous union for a wife, versus 
being in a monogamous union, decreases the number of her 
children ever born by 9 per cent; controlling for age of 
the husband. 
 After adding another control variable in Model 4, that 
is, whether the family lives in an urban area (coded 1 if 
yes), the polygyny variable still maintains its negative 
significant effect on the children ever born; its magnitude 
does not change much from Model 3. 
 When I added a biological variable to the equation in 
Model 5, age at menarche (in years), the polygyny variable 
maintains its negative effect and statistical significance; 
with a coefficient of -0.108.    
Moving to Model 6, I added whether a woman agreed to 
marry her husband, as a fifth control variable. Once again 
the magnitude of the polygyny variable hardly changes at 
all from its value in Models 4 and 5. Its coefficient of -
0.109 has an odds ratio of 0.898. This means that being in 
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a polygynous union, versus being in a monogamous union, 
decreases the number of children ever born by almost 10 per 
cent, controlling for a host of independent variables. 
 Model 7 is the full model and it includes all the 
previous independent variables along with controls for the 
number of wives in the union. When I control for the number 
of wives in the union, the polygyny variable loses its 
significant negative effect on children ever born. Thus, 
the production of CEB does not significantly vary between 
wives in polygynous unions and wives in monogamous unions, 
controlling for the number of wives in the unions and all 
the other previous independent variables. 
 This intriguing relationship deserves additional 
discussion. It would appear from my statistical analysis 
that a key reason for the demonstrated negative association 
between polygyny and CEB is the number of wives in the 
marriage. The more the number of wives, the less the CEB.  
I address in more detail in the next chapter some of the 
implications of this intriguing relationship.  
 The last two columns of Table 14 present the semi-
standardized odds ratios and their percentage change values 
for Model 7. These semi-standardized odds ratios indicate 
that age of the husband is the most influential covariate 
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predicting the children ever born to women, followed by age 
at first marriage, number of the wives in the union, 
whether the couple resides in an urban area, age at 
menarche, whether wife accepts to marry her husband, and 
lastly whether the wife is in polygynous union. 
 At the bottom of the table I report the Pseduo R2 
values for each model; this provides information about how 
well the model fits the data. The results of the Pseduo R2 
indicate that as I add more independent variables to the 
model, the better the model fit. Thus, the more complex 
model (Model 7, i.e., with seven independent variables) is 
a better fit than the other simpler models (Model 1 to 6). 
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 Table 14.  Negative Binomial Regression Models of the 
            Effect of Currently Being in a Polygynous 
            Union, versus in a Monogamous Union, On the 
            Children Ever Born for the Emarati Married 
            Women, 1999 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Polygynous 
Union (yes=1) 
  
0.200* 
(0.041) 
  
-0.1615* 
(0.0353) 
  
-0.102* 
(0.032) 
 
-0.109* 
(0.032) 
  
-0.108* 
(0.032) 
 
-0.109* 
(0.032) 
 
Age of Husband 
    
0.038* 
(0.001) 
  
0.030* 
(0.001) 
 
 0.030* 
(0.001) 
 
 0.030 
(0.001) 
 
 0.030* 
(0.001) 
 
Age at 1st 
Marriage 
   
-0.067* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.067* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.068* 
(0.003) 
  
1.032* 
(0.013) 
 
 
Urban 
Residence 
(yes=1) 
    
-0.082* 
(0.022) 
 
-0.076* 
(0.022) 
 
-0.075* 
(0.022) 
 
 
Age at 
Menarche (in 
years) 
      
0.022* 
(0.009) 
 
 0.022* 
(0.009) 
 
 
Marriage 
Acceptance 
(yes=1) 
       
-0.058 
(0.080) 
 
Number of 
Wives in the 
union 
      
 
Constant 
 
1.565* 
 
0.023   
 
1.523* 
 
1.549* 
 
1.277* 
  
1.331* 
       
Pseduo R2 0.0014 0.0736 0.1025 0.1033 0.1036  0.1037 
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 Table 14.  Continued 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Model 7 
 
Odds 
Ratios** 
 
Semi-
Standardized 
Odds Ratios** 
 
Percentage 
Change in 
Semi-
Standardized 
Odds Ratios 
 
Polygynous Union 
(yes=1) 
  
0.011 
(0.036) 
 
1.011 
  
1.004 
  
0.4 
 
Age of Husband 
  
0.032* 
(0.001) 
 
 
1.033 
 
 1.499 
  
50.0 
 
Age at 1st 
Marriage 
 
-0.065* 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.937 
  
0.775 
  
-22.5 
 
Urban Residence 
(yes=1) 
 
-0.083* 
(0.022) 
 
 
0.921 
  
0.962 
 
 -3.8 
 
Age at Menarche 
(in years 
  
0.020* 
(0.009) 
 
 
1.020 
  
1.024 
   
2.4 
 
Marriage 
Acceptance (yes=1) 
 
 
 
-0.077 
(0.065) 
 
0.926 
  
0.989 
  
-1.1 
Number of Wives in 
the union 
 
-0.216* 
(0.029) 
 
 
0.806 
 
0.913 
  
-8.7 
 
Constant 
 
 1.480* 
   
     
 
Pseduo R2 
  
0.1069 
   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
* p<0.05 
      ** Odds ratios and semi-standardized odds ratios apply only to Model 7  
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DISCUSSION 
 In the first 5 models, after controlling for the 
numerous biological and social variables, the polygyny 
variable was shown to be significant and negative in 
predicting the cumulative fertility of married Emarati 
women, i.e., the children ever born to married Emarati 
women. This is inconsistent with my major hypothesis that 
polygyny has a significant positive effect on woman’s 
fertility.  However, the final model shows that the 
polygyny variable, as expected, has a positive effect, but 
this effect is not significant when controlling for the 
number of wives in the union. In other words, when I 
control for number of wives, the negative association of 
polygyny and CEB disappears.  In addition to its 
insignificant effect on woman’s cumulative fertility, the 
semi-standardized odds ratios in the last model show that 
polygyny has the least influential effect on woman’s 
fertility. 
 One of the explanations in the literature, mainly from 
African countries, for the negative association between 
polygyny and CEB is the number of wives in the marriage.  
The more the number of wives in the union, the less the 
CEB.  Garenne and Van de Walle (1989) have demonstrated 
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that the mechanism through which polygyny lower women’s 
fertility is that polygyny monopolizes younger women for 
the benefit of older men. Thus, as the number of wives 
increases, the age difference between the spouses 
increases, while male fecundity decreases with age. 
This hypothesis is confirmed when I examined the 
relationship between number of wives in the union and age 
differences between spouses in my study population. Thus, 
among the Emarati married women, when the number of wives 
increases in the union, the age differences between spouses 
increases, controlling for numerous social and biological 
variables.  
Also, in their study, Garenne and Van de Walle (1989) 
have showed that the decline of female fertility with 
increasing number of wives is mostly accounted for by the 
effect of the age of the husband. This probably explains 
the negative association between polygyny and Emarati 
women’s cumulative fertility, when controlling for both age 
of the husband and number of wives in the union.  This is 
also confirmed when I have estimated the same model (i.e. 
Model 7) using age difference between spouses as a control 
variable instead of age of the husband (because of 
multicollinearity I was not able to include both of them in 
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the same model). For instance, when I have estimated the 
polygyny effect on CEB controlling for the age difference 
between spouses, instead of age of the husband, as well as 
including the same control variables in Model 7, the 
polygyny variable has the expected relationship, namely a 
positive significant relationship with women’s cumulative 
fertility. These results show that polygynous wives have 16 
per cent more children ever born to them than monogamous 
wives, controlling for the age differences between spouses, 
number of wives in the union, and the other control 
variables. 
As for my other two hypotheses, namely, my prediction 
of the negative effect on CEB of husband’s age and the 
negative effect on CEB of the number of wives in the union, 
the later predication is confirmed. Thus, the results 
indicate that as the number of wives increases in the 
union, the production of CEB decreases by 19 per cent, 
controlling for the other variables. 
However, my prediction of the negative effect of 
husband’s age on woman’s cumulative fertility is not 
confirmed. My results seem to indicate that as the age of 
the husband increases, the production of CEB increases by 3 
per cent, holding the other variables constant. This 
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unexpected finding seems to run counter to the idea that as 
husbands become older, their wives’ cumulative fertility 
decreases. 
As for the other variables in the last model, the 
results show that woman’s age at first marriage, residing 
in urban area, and age at menarche all have a significant 
effect on predicting woman’s cumulative fertility. Thus, 
both age at first marriage and urban residence show a 
negative effect on fertility. The results show that as the 
age of marriage increases, woman’s cumulative fertility 
decreases by 6 per cent, controlling for the other 
variables. Also, residing in urban areas reduces woman’s 
cumulative fertility by 8 per cent, controlling for the 
other variables. In contrast, the results show that age at 
menarche has a significant positive effect on woman’s 
cumulative fertility. Thus, as age at menarche increases, 
woman’s cumulative fertility increases by 2 per cent. 
However, similar to my previous analyses of current 
fertility, wives’ acceptance to marry their husbands has no 
statistical effect on their cumulative fertility, 
controlling for the other variables. 
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In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail my 
findings and implications for this dissertation, and then 
will make suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter of my dissertation, I review and 
discuss the findings presented in earlier chapters. Next, I 
discuss the general implications of this research dealing 
with polygyny and fertility. Then I focus on UAE population 
policy and the attempts to increase the fertility of UAE 
nationals. Finally, I put forth some suggestions for future 
research about the effects of polygyny on fertility. 
FINDINGS 
Using data from a nationally representative sample 
survey conducted in the United Arab Emirates in 1998-1999, 
this dissertation has examined the effect of polygyny on 
married Emarati women’s fertility. Two different measures 
of fertility have been employed: the first is a current 
fertility measure, that is, the occurrence of a baby in the 
past 12 months; and the second is a cumulative fertility 
measure, that is, the children ever born in the woman’s 
lifetime. Both measures apply to married Emarati women. 
There are many reasons for using two measures of 
fertility in this dissertation. First, I attempted to see 
if using different measures of fertility results in 
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different findings. Second, I endeavored to examine the 
impact of polygyny on both women’s current and cumulative 
fertility. Third, I wanted to be able to gauge the effects 
of woman’s present social and demographic characteristics, 
such as her education, employment status, her husband’s 
education, contraceptive use, and co-residence status on 
her fertility. Thus as mentioned before, much of the 
information in the survey is reflecting women’s present 
characteristics. But the survey does not always measure the 
woman’s characteristics at the time of her conception(s). 
So in order to be able to use this important information 
about UAE women and about UAE nationals’ family life, 
different kinds of measures needed to be used. For 
instance, when I predict current fertility, I can use as 
independent variables social and demographic 
characteristics at the time of survey, such as women’s 
education, employment status, contraceptive use, co-
residence status, and their husband’s education. But when I 
predict the cumulative fertility measure, I can only use 
women’s characteristics at the time of conception or their 
characteristics that do not change over time, such as their 
residence status during the first 12 years of their lives, 
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whether they have agreed to marry their husbands, their age 
at menarche, their age at first marriage, and so forth. 
The research reported in this dissertation was also 
restricted to analyses of the polygyny effect on fertility 
among currently married women who were married only once. 
This restriction is needed because many researchers have 
shown that one of the confounding factors that may 
interrupt the effect of polygyny on fertility is the 
marital instability of women. Thus, the number of marriages 
a woman has had may well affect her number of live births 
(Varea, et al. 1996; Mulder 1989). 
In my dissertation I have shown that after controlling 
for relevant biological and social factors, polygyny, that 
is, being in a polygynous union versus being in a 
monogamous union, has positively and significantly 
influenced wife’s current fertility, namely, her likelihood 
of having a baby in the past 12 months. However, when I 
introduce a control for the number of wives in the union, 
the effect of polygyny on wife’s current fertility looses 
its significance. 
In contrast, I also show that polygyny has a negative 
and significant effect on the wife’s cumulative fertility, 
i.e., the number of children ever born to her. However, as 
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in the case with current fertility, it is only when 
controlling for the number of wives in the union that the 
negative significant influence of polygyny on wife’s 
cumulative fertility becomes altered.  Thus, after 
controlling for the number of wives in the union, being in 
a polygynous union versus being in a monogamous union has a 
positive effect on the number of children ever born to 
Emarati women, but, as was the case with wife’s current 
fertility, this effect is not statistically significant. 
As previously mentioned in CHAPTER II, there is no 
consensus on the effect of polygyny on female fertility. 
However, most studies, especially those conducted in 
African countries and in Mormon communities in the United 
States, seem to agree that polygyny is usually negatively 
associated with female fertility (Musham 1956; Ivins 1956; 
Dorjahn 1958;Van de Walle 1965; Henin 1969; Page 1975; 
Ukaegbu 1977; Brown 1981; Farooq 1985; Bhatia 1985; Shaikh 
et al. 1987;Garenne and Van de Walle 1989;  Hern 1992; 
Josephson 2002; Lardoux and Van de Walle 2003). My findings 
on Emarati women’s cumulative fertility (i.e. their CEB) 
are thus consistent with these findings of prior research, 
that is, polygyny has negative effect on women’s fertility; 
but when I controlled for the number of wives in the union, 
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my research shows that polygyny is no longer negatively 
affecting Emarati women’s cumulative fertility. More 
precisely, it shows that polygyny has a positive but 
insignificant effect on women’s fertility. This last 
conclusion also emerged when I examined the polygyny effect 
on Emarati women’s current fertility (i.e. their likelihood 
of having a baby in the past 12 months). Thus, controlling 
for the number of wives in the union, polygyny no longer 
has the expected significant and positive effect on women’s 
likelihood of having a recent birth. This finding for 
current fertility is, in fact, consistent with prior 
research that showed a positive effect of polygyny on 
women’s fertility, as Sueyoshi and Ohtsuka’s (2003) study 
in Jordon, Sembajwe’s (1979) study of the Yoruba (Western 
Nigeria), and Arowolo’s(1981) study in Ibadan, (Nigeria). 
However, my research shows that this positive effect 
disappears when controlling for the number of wives in the 
union. 
The research in my dissertation has also showed that 
even though the polygyny variable is not statistically 
significant after controlling for the number of wives in 
the union, its influence on women’s current fertility is 
still greater than some of the biological and social 
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factors such as husband’s education, age at menarche, 
residing in urban area, agreed to marry the husband, using 
contraceptives in the past, and co-residing with another 
wife (or wives). In contrast, for cumulative fertility, the 
polygyny variable has the least influential effect on 
women’s fertility; after age of the husband, age at first 
marriage, number of wife (or wives) in the union, residing 
in urban areas, age at menarche, and agreed to marry the 
husband. 
It would appear from my statistical analysis that 
polygyny influences the fertility of Emarati women through 
a key mechanism. This mechanism is the number of wives in 
the union. Thus, the key reason for the demonstrated 
positive association between polygyny and women’s 
likelihood of having a baby in the past 12 months; and the 
key reason for the negative association between polygyny 
and women’s CEB is the number of wives in the union. In 
other words, the results indicate that the effect of 
polygyny on women’s current and cumulative fertility is 
mostly accounted for by the effect of the number of wives 
in the union. 
I will discuss next some of the possible explanations 
for these results about the polygyny effect on women’s 
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current and cumulative fertility, namely why polygyny has a 
positive effect on women’s current fertility but a negative 
effect on their cumulative fertility. 
One of the reasons for these conflicting results may 
have to do with the way I have defined marital status. For 
instance, I have defined women’s marital status as a binary 
variable, that is, a woman can only be a monogamous or a 
polygynous wife. The problem with this definition is that 
it fails, to some extent, to capture the differences in 
fertility between the wife’s  rank in polygynous union and 
their monogamous counterparts; and between polygynous wives 
themselves, namely between lower and higher order wives. 
Instead, a better definition of marital status would 
consider the wife order in polygynous unions in order to 
avoid the aggregation of fertility of all polygynously 
married women (Mulder 1989). Furthermore, a better approach 
for capturing the fertility differences, especially when 
measuring women’s current fertility (i.e., her likelihood 
of having a baby in the past 12 months), would be to 
compare the fertility of monogamous wives and polygynous 
wives not only by the wife order, but also by the mean 
number of co-wives of reproductive age married to a woman’s 
husband during her own reproductive career (Mulder 1989). 
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Such an approach would be more sensitive to the 
reproductive competition between monogamous and polygynous 
wives, and between polygynous wives themselves. Unlike 
cumulative fertility, current fertility is very sensitive 
to the women’s current reproduction status. For example, if 
women have ceased reproduction more than one year ago, or 
if they are infertile, which is not an uncommon situation 
among first wives, they will not be in a direct competition 
with the other wives in any marital union (i.e., with 
monogamous wives or with their co-wives in polygynous 
unions). In fact, one of the limitations of the data from 
the UAE survey I used in this study is that polygynous 
wives are not identified by their rank in the marital 
union. 
Another reason for the demonstrated positive effect of 
polygyny on current fertility and the negative effect on 
cumulative fertility, which are accounted for by the effect 
of the number of wives in the union, might be a result of a 
high incidence of higher-order wives in my study 
population. For instance, as I just mentioned, I have 
examined the aggregated fertility differences between women 
in polygynous and monogamous unions instead of examining 
the differences between monogamous fertility and polygynous 
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fertility by wife order and by their reproduction status 
(i.e., being fertile, infertile, or sub-fertile wives). If 
I have a high incidence of higher-order wives in my study 
population, then the higher-order wives will by definition 
have had marriages of shorter duration, compared to lower- 
order wives. This would have likely lowered the fertility 
of all polygynous wives. Thus, many studies have showed 
that, over all, higher-order wives will have lower 
cumulative fertility than the lower-order wives (Smith and 
Kunz 1976; Sween and Clignet 1978; Arowolo 1981; Anderton 
and Emight 1989).  However, Muhsam (1956) found that second 
wives had higher fertility than first wives, though not 
consistently at all ages, as a result of favoritism by 
their husbands. Lardoux and Van de Walle (2003) have also 
shown that after controlling for age and number of wives in 
the union, wives of higher rank tend to have higher 
fertility than wives of lower rank. So it might be that a 
large number of polygynous wives in my study population are 
higher-order wives, which consequently has affected 
polygynous wives’ current fertility positively and the 
polygynous wives’ cumulative fertility negatively. 
 Studies have also found that a larger difference in 
age at marriage between the husbands and higher-order wives 
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may also force the higher-order wives into unions with 
older, and probably less fecund, husbands (Ukaegbu  1981). 
Therefore, if my study population has a high incidence of 
higher-order wives, the age differences between them and 
their husbands might be another explanation for my 
findings. Thus, the higher-order wives are more likely to 
give a recent birth (Lardoux and Van de Walle 2003), but 
less likely to have more children ever born to them than 
monogamous wives or their lower-order co-wives (Smith and 
Kunz 1976; Sween and Clignet 1978; Arowolo 1981; Anderton 
and Emight 1989). 
A third reasons for the conflicting findings of the 
polygyny effect on women’s current and cumulative fertility 
is the difficulty in this study to control for some of the 
confounding influences of the variety of mechanisms through 
which polygyny affects fertility, i.e., some of the factors 
that often accompany polygyny. For instance, several 
studies have showed that certain factors may select certain 
types of women in polygynous unions (Bean and Mineau 1986;  
Mulder 1992; Sueyoshi and Ohtshka 2003). To illustrate, 
husbands who recognize that their wives are infecund  or 
sub-fecund, especially at the early ages of marriage, tend 
to have an additional wife (or wives), and the first wives 
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will become senior polygynous wives (Sueyoshi and Ohtsuka  
2003). Thus, if my study population has a high incidence of 
infertile or sub-fertile women, these women are more likely 
to be found in polygynous unions than in monogamous ones, 
which will lower the average cumulative fertility for all 
polygynous wives (Van de Walle 1965). Moreover, if the 
husband is sub-fecund, the fertility of any additional 
wives will be lower as well (Anderton and Emight 1989). 
Even when I have controlled for the effects of marital 
status (by restricting my analysis to only currently 
married women who are once married), the expected 
relationship between polygyny and fertility did not emerge. 
It was only when I controlled for the number of wives in 
the union that I was able to find the expected relationship 
between polygyny and cumulative fertility.  It is also 
probably that, as Anderton and Emight (1989) have 
suggested, using aggregated fertility difference between 
women in monogamous and polygynous marriages makes it 
difficult to explain the relationship between polygyny and 
fertility because of additional confounding factors. So in 
order to conclude that fertility differences are a result 
of women’s marital status, one needs to eliminate these 
confounding factors that might intermediate the 
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relationship between polygyny and fertility. One way to do 
that, as suggested by Anderton and Emight (1989), would be 
to limit attention to polygynous marital fertility because 
by doing so it is possible for the researcher to analyze, 
or to control for, the nature of polygynous unions 
occurring in the given population, such as the ages of the 
husband and wife at marriage, as well as infertility; and 
in turn it is possible to identify more precisely the 
effects of polygyny on fertility behavior in the marital 
unions. 
Nevertheless, my expected positive relationship 
between polygyny and fertility in the UAE is found when I 
analyze women’s current fertility, but is not found when I 
study women’s cumulative fertility. Number of wives in the 
union is the mechanism through which polygyny affects 
Emarati women’s fertility.  Thus, the main reason for the 
higher current fertility of wives in polygynous unions, 
compared to wives in monogamous unions, is the number of 
wives in the union. The higher the number of wives in the 
union, the higher the likelihood of women giving a baby in 
the past 12 months. This probably is due to the presence of 
higher order-wives in the union. In general, higher order-
wives are more likely to have a recent baby than the lower 
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order-wives, because they are not only more likely to be in 
sexual competition with the lower-order co-wives, but also 
with their monogamous counterparts whose fertility, in 
fact, should be compared with the first wives, not with the 
higher-order wives. Because, in general, younger wives who 
are higher-order wives in the union are sexually preferred, 
and they thus tend to have higher fertility than lower-
order wives (Lardoux and Van de Walle 2003). 
Not only is the number of wives in the union a key 
reason for the demonstrated polygyny-fertility 
relationship, but also the age of the husband is another 
mechanism through which polygyny affects Emarati women’s 
fertility. As I have showed in CHAPTER VII, the decline of 
Emarati women’s cumulative fertility with increasing number 
of wives is mostly accounted for by the effect of husband’s 
age. This was confirmed when I controlled for the age 
difference between spouses and number of wives in a 
separate model. That is, when I controlled for age 
difference between spouses and number of wives in the union 
as well as for the other social and biological variables, 
the results showed that polygynous wives have 16 per cent 
more children born to them than monogamous wives.  
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Even though my main focus in this dissertation was 
with examining the relationship between polygyny on women’s 
fertility, it is of interest as well to look at the effects 
of other variables on Emarati women’s fertility. I will 
consider the effects of age of husband, wife’s co-residence 
with another wife (or wives), number of wives in her 
marriage union, her age at first marriage, her employment 
status, whether she resides in an urban area, and whether 
she has agreed to marry her husband, on her current and 
cumulative fertility. In doing so, I will also be able to 
examine my other hypotheses, namely the negative effect of 
husband’s age, the positive effect of co-residence with 
another wife (or wives), and the negative effect of number 
of wives in the union on women’s fertility. 
The findings of this dissertation have showed that for 
both current and cumulative fertility, age of the husband 
has the most influential effect. For current fertility, it 
is followed by number of wives in the union, age at first 
marriage, and working outside the home, while for 
cumulative fertility, it is followed by age at first 
marriage, number of wives in union, and residing in urban 
areas. 
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In addition, my findings show that while current 
fertility of a wife decreases as the husband ages, which is 
consistent with Garenne and Van de Walle’s (1989) research, 
the cumulative fertility of a wife increases as husband 
ages. In other words, my hypothesis of the negative effect 
of husbands’ age on wife’s fertility is confirmed for 
current fertility, but not so for cumulative fertility. 
Thus, when the husbands’ age increases by one year, the 
probability of wives producing a child in the past year 
decreases by 6 per cent, controlling for the other 
variables. In contrast, as the age of husbands increases, 
the production of children ever born to wives increases by 
3 per cent, holding the other variables constant. One 
explanation for this difference in the effect of age of 
husband on current and cumulative fertility might be that 
in cumulative fertility, unsurprisingly, as a husband lives 
longer, his wife will be more so exposed to coital 
frequency, and therefore the more children she will have in 
her lifetime. 
My findings also indicate that my third hypothesis, 
namely that co-residing with another wife (or wives) should 
have a positive effect on woman’s current fertility, is not 
confirmed. For instance, my findings show that co-residing 
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with another wife (or wives) has the same expected 
direction (positive), but this effect is not significant on 
predicting the probability of a wife having a recent birth, 
controlling for the other variables. 
My last hypothesis is that as the number of wives in 
the union increases, the wife’s fertility will decrease. 
This hypothesis was confirmed with regard to cumulative 
fertility, but not with respect to current fertility. For 
instance, for cumulative fertility, my findings show that 
as the number of wives increases in the union, the children 
ever born decreases by 19 per cent, controlling for the 
other variables. This finding is consistent with Lardoux 
and Van de Wall’s (2003) findings that fertility in Senegal 
tends to decrease with the increase in the number of wives 
in the union. In contrast, for current fertility, when the 
number of wives of a polygynist increases by one wife, the 
probability of the occurrence of a birth increases by 54 
per cent, controlling for the other variables. This finding 
appears to support my previous discussion on the possible 
influence of higher-order wives on current fertility of all 
polygynous wives. Moreover, another explanation for this 
positive association is likely that current fertility was 
able to capture the competition factor between wives to 
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produce more children as each one of them will try to have 
more children to show the mutual love between her and her 
husband to the other wives. Co-wives also will try to 
alternate births between them in order to produce more 
children to satisfy their husband’s demand for more 
children, which is one of the main reasons men marry 
multiple wives, i.e., to have more children. Furthermore, 
sometimes, wives will not only try to alternate births 
between them, but will also try to give birth when the 
other wives do. For example, Lardoux and Van de Walle 
(2003) showed that the odds of one wife giving a birth were 
higher when another wife had a birth at the same time. To 
illustrate, in unions with two wives, when the second wife 
has a child, the probability of a birth to the first wife 
is substantially increased, even without any control for 
age of the husband. In addition, as previously discussed, 
unlike other populations practicing polygyny, among Emarati 
married men, the majority of polygynists are married to two 
wives, and not to more. Indeed, 82 per cent of Emarati men 
who are polygynists are married to two wives, 12 per cent 
to three wives, and 6 per cent to four wives. This may well 
explain why that the majority of polygynists can divide 
their time relatively evenly between their wives and, 
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presumably increase sexual competition and increase the 
risk of pregnancy for each wife; most of them have only two 
wives. Furthermore, even if the wives do not live in the 
same residence, which according to the coital frequency 
model should decrease the fertility of each woman, the 
spatial distance between the homes of each wife is usually 
not an issue in the UAE with modern infrastructure and 
transportation, and with the fact that wives are usually 
living within close proximity to one another even if they 
have separate residences. 
In fact, while the positive effect of number of wives 
in the union on current fertility has strong support for 
the demand for the progeny model, the negative effect of 
number of wives in the union on cumulative fertility has 
strong support for the favoritism model. 
My results also show that wife’s age at marriage has a 
significant effect on both current and cumulative 
fertility. However, this effect works in opposite 
directions. For instance, as woman’s age at first marriage 
increases, her current fertility is shown to increase by 3 
per cent, controlling for the other variables. In contrast, 
as woman’s age at first marriage increases, her cumulative 
fertility decreases by 6 per cent, controlling for the 
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other variable. One explanation for the positive effect of 
age at first marriage on woman’s current fertility is that 
the current fertility measure (i.e., the likelihood of a 
woman giving a baby in the past 12 months) was able to 
capture the effect of woman’s postponing first marriage on 
her attempts to make up for the time she spent unmarried. 
For instance, a woman who married later can shorten her 
birth spacing periods and catch up in childbearing with, or 
even surpass, her counterpart who married at a younger age. 
In other words, the older a woman is when she gets married, 
the more likely she will try to accelerate childbearing to 
compensate for the initial delay (Anderton and Emight  
1989). Thus the more likely it is that she will have had a 
recent birth (in the last 12 months). 
In contrast, the explanation for the negative effect 
of age at the first marriage on cumulative fertility is 
that the cumulative fertility measure (i.e., children ever 
born to a woman) captures the effect of the timing of 
marriage on a woman’s lifetime fertility. Thus, if a woman 
marries at younger age, she will have more children born to 
her than a woman who marries at an older age. 
Age at first marriage is not the only independent 
variable that has an opposite influence when predicting 
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current and cumulative fertility. Whether the woman resides 
in an urban area also has such an opposite influence. To 
illustrate, residing in an urban area was shown to have a 
statistical negative impact on woman’s cumulative 
fertility, but no significant influence on her current 
fertility, controlling for the other variables. 
Working outside the house has a significant influence 
on woman’s current fertility. It decreases woman’s current 
fertility by 26 per cent, controlling for the other 
variables. In contrast, Emarati women’s education, her 
husband’s education, and whether she has ever used 
contraceptives, do not have any significant effects on her 
current fertility. 
Moreover, whether or not a wife agreed to marry her 
husband has no significant impact on her current or her 
cumulative fertility. One reason is the lack of variation 
in this independent variable. For instance, almost 98 per 
cent of Emarati women have agreed to marry their husbands. 
Another reason is perhaps the strong influence of the 
pronatalist culture on woman’s decision for having 
children. As a Muslim and socially traditional society, the 
UAE culture encourages spouses to have many children, 
mainly because producing more children will ensure the 
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spouses the means of achieving their societal and family 
goals, such as preservation of the family and lineage, 
providing labor and emotional support, and providing old-
age security for themselves.  In fact, demographic 
processes, such as fertility, are less the direct product 
of an explicit concern about numbers of desired children, 
and more so the result of individual strategies and 
decisions reflecting the structure of power in the society 
(Obermeyer 1992). It is no doubt then that many Emarati 
women define marriage as a legal and social institution for 
producing children. Without children the marriage 
institution is considered to be an incomplete state 
(Alnuaimi 2001). Thus, having many children is considered a 
symbol of importance and success in life. Also, the social 
status of women still tends to be based on marriage and 
raring children, especially boys. Moreover, since socio-
economic security and family stability both depend on the 
number of children in the family, it seems that spouses 
will continue to view marriage as the means for achieving 
these societal goals, irrespective of whether they have 
agreed to marry each other or not.  
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IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, I will discuss some of the 
implications of my research on polygyny and fertility for 
the literature. Then I will discuss, to a greater extent, 
the implications of my research for the UAE. 
Implications of My Study for the Literature of Polygyny and 
Fertility 
According to Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000), fertility 
has historically been the key component of population 
change and the most difficult to predict.  There are many 
social factors that influence human fertility. Some of 
these factors are shared by all members of the population, 
such as marriage, education, contraceptives use, female 
labor force participation, and residence. Some factors are 
heavily found in certain populations, such as postpartum 
infecundability and abstinence, as in Africa; and some 
factors are only restricted to certain populations, such as 
polygyny. 
Therefore, it is important for demographers to 
consider these differences between populations when 
studying the mechanisms through which certain factors (or 
determinants) influence one of the main demographic 
processes they study, that is, fertility. For instance, 
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many studies have shown that polygyny, as a type of 
marriage highly practiced in many African societies, is 
influencing female fertility in many populations in these 
societies.  Some of these studies have shown that the 
effect of polygyny on female fertility is negative (Musham 
1956; Ivins 1956; Dorjahn 1958;Van de Walle 1965; Henin 
1969; Page 1975; Ukaegbu 1977; Brown 1981; Farooq 1985; 
Bhatia 1985; Shaikh et al. 1987;Garenne and Van de Walle 
1989;  Hern 1992; Josephson 2002; Lardoux and Van de Walle 
2003), others that it is positive (Sembajwe 1979; Arowolo 
1981; Sueyoshi and Ohtsuka 2003); and still others that 
there is no relationship, or if any, it has only marginal 
influence (Ohadike 1968; Pool 1968; Olusanya 1971; 
Seetharam and Duza 1976; Chojnacka 1980; Logue 1984; Ahmed 
1986; Sichona 1993). In any case, demographers can no 
longer ignore the effect of polygyny on female fertility 
when studying women’s reproductive behavior in societies 
where monogamy is not universal. 
The effect of polygyny on female fertility is indeed a 
complex relationship. It needs to be examined in different 
social settings and using different methods in order to be 
able to identify the mechanisms though which polygyny 
influences fertility. 
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In this dissertation, I was able to examine the 
polygyny effect on fertility in a new social setting, in 
the United Arab Emirates. I claim that this is new because 
my analysis is the first study, to my knowledge, of 
polygyny and fertility in an oil rich Gulf country. Most 
prior studies have been undertaken in African societies, in 
some lowland South American societies, in certain Mormon 
communities, in some non-Arab Muslim societies (e.g., in 
Bangladesh), and in some Arab non-Gulf Muslim societies 
(e.g., in Jordan and in Morocco). My study is also new 
because the social setting is very different than that we 
are used to read about in the literature. Most of the 
polygyny-fertility studies reported in the literature were 
conducted in African countries where very different 
economic, social, and cultural factors play a role in 
determining the relationship. In fact, one of the main 
objectives of my dissertation was to see if examining the 
polygyny-fertility relationship in a different social 
setting might result in a different relationship than that 
found in the African countries, and to explore the 
mechanisms through which polygyny affects fertility. 
I was also able to use different methods to examine 
the polygyny effect on fertility, and to show that polygyny 
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influences fertility through certain factors, particularly, 
number of wives in the union and age of the husband. 
This dissertation also points to the importance of 
using different methods to examine social relationships. 
For instance, in my dissertation I used different measures 
of fertility to examine the impact of polygyny, and other 
variables, on the reproductive behavior of women. I studied 
the effect of polygyny on the likelihood of the occurrence 
of a birth in the past 12 months, as well as the children 
ever born to her. In so doing, my findings were able to 
capture different aspects of the effects of certain 
variables on different measures of fertility. For instance, 
unlike its effect on cumulative fertility, age of marriage 
variable was able to capture the effect of woman’s 
postponing marriage on her current fertility. I reasoned 
that when a woman marries late, she tends to accelerate her 
childbearing to compensate for her initial delay of 
marriage. When I examined the effect of this same variable 
on cumulative fertility, I did not show the same 
association. Also, using different measures of fertility 
enabled me to suggest the different mechanisms through 
which the polygyny-fertility relationship occurs. 
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Implications of My Study for UAE Population Policy 
Unlike virtually all countries of the world, except 
for Qatar, the majority, indeed over 80 per cent, of the 
population of the United Arab Emirates is comprised of non-
citizens of the UAE. Accordingly the government of the UAE 
has adopted a range of policies aimed at increasing its 
population size. These policies can be classified into two 
types. One focuses on natural increase, that is, raising 
fertility and lowering mortality; and the other focuses on 
migration. 
In this section, I will only discuss the policy 
attempts of the UAE government to raise its population by 
increasing the fertility of UAE nationals. 
According to the 2003 United Nations World Fertility 
Report, the UAE was among the governments that perceive the 
national fertility level in 2001 as too low; therefore, the 
UAE’s aim was to raise its fertility level so as to 
increase population growth (United Nation 2003).  However, 
recent publications from the United Nations regarding world 
population policies in 2005 indicate that the UAE, as a 
previously pronatalist government, gradually changed its 
stance in recent years and accepted family planning and 
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contraception as an integral part of maternal and child 
health programs (United nation 2005). 
Indeed, unlike other countries, the UAE government has 
never imposed any direct means for increasing fertility. 
Instead, the government has established several indirect 
means aimed in the first place at easing the living 
expenses for its people and providing better health care 
for children and their mothers; such may well have a 
positive influence on the fertility of UAE nationals.  I 
will point here to four indirect means, which probably have 
influenced fertility, but were originally set forth by the 
UAE government to help UAE nationals cope with living 
expenses and enhance their maternal and child health care. 
The first involves providing incentives to national 
families when one of the parents is working in the 
governmental sector. These incentives are given as a 
monthly allowance and added to one parent’s salary for 
every one child in the family (around $163/month per 
child). 
The second is that UAE national families with a large 
number of children are given priority by government for 
housing and housing loans. 
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The third is the establishment of the Marriage Fund 
Organization. Because getting married in the UAE can be 
very expensive, the Marriage Fund Organization was 
established in 1992 in order to encourage single UAE 
national men and women to marry, to help them overcome the 
financial obstacles preventing them from marrying, to try 
to reduce the number of their marriages to non-national 
women, and to strengthen traditional family bonds. A 
typical wedding between nationals in the UAE can cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for receptions, wardrobe, 
jewellery, dowry, and gifts. As a result, many young 
national men take on significant amounts of debt through 
commercial banks to meet the wedding expenses. This often 
leads to stress and strain in the marriage. Even more 
worrisome for the government than wedding expenses is the 
fact that many national men were marrying non-national 
women, frequently because of the lower costs. This is 
thought to lead to cultural and social problems in the 
marriages, and between the newly married UAE nationals and 
the larger society.  Since 1992, the Marriage Fund has 
provided financial assistance for over 44,000 weddings; as 
a consequence the percentage of marriages of UAE nationals 
to non-national women has declined. 
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The Marriage Fund does not have as direct goals the 
raising of the fertility of UAE nationals. But it does 
provide assistance and encouragement for national men and 
women to marry at relatively earlier ages, rather than 
waiting until the men are financially better able to 
provide their wedding expenses. This could well delay 
marriages to older ages. The Fund thus helps couples to 
marry and start having family and children at earlier ages. 
The fourth is the establishment of labour laws that 
ease the difficulties involved in rearing children and 
working outside the home. To illustrate, under the Labour 
Law Article 30,  a “female worker shall be entitled to 
maternity leave with full pay for a period of forty five 
days, including both pre and post natal periods, 
provided that she has completed not less than one year of 
continuous service with her employer. A female worker who 
has not completed the aforesaid period of service shall be 
entitled to maternity leave with half pay” (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs 1980: 12). Also, Labour Law Article 
31 states that “During the 18 months following her delivery, 
a female worker nursing her child shall, in addition to any 
prescribed rest period, be entitled to two additional 
breaks each day for this purpose, neither of which shall 
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exceed half an hour. These two additional breaks shall be 
considered as part of the working hours and shall not entail 
any reduction of wage” (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, 1980: 12). 
In addition, recent legislation in the UAE government 
guarantees the maternity leaves of Emarati working women, a 
new change in both Article 30 and 31. Thus, the relevant 
new civil service law approved on November, 4, 2001 states 
that “Emirati women will be given, for purposes of child 
care, two months fully paid maternity leave, two more 
months on half-pay leave, and then another two months leave 
without pay” (El-Haddad 2006: 287).  
The question I raised in the Introduction chapter of 
this dissertation was whether polygyny might become another 
component in a UAE population policy to increase the 
fertility of UAE nationals. The UAE nationals comprised no 
more than 20 percent of the total UAE population in 2005, 
and according to Albayan, a local governmental newspaper, 
the percentage fell to 13.5 per cent in 2007 (Abdelhamed 
2008). So, would increasing the prevalence of polygyny 
among the nationals produce more children? Should polygyny 
be one of the elements of UAE population policy to help 
deal with the demographic problem facing the UAE today? 
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Actually, my dissertation results show that polygynous 
wives’ current and cumulative fertility is not 
significantly different from that of monogamous wives, 
controlling for the number of wives in the union and age of 
the husband.  However, one might argue that if the number 
of wives influences women’s fertility through the effect of 
husband’s age, polygyny might indeed be able to positively 
influence women’s fertility by encouraging men to marry 
multiple wives at younger ages. To illustrate, with 
financial support from the UAE government, Emarati men 
would no longer have a serious financial burden if marrying 
more than one wife at early ages. Therefore, a population 
policy should consider polygyny as an important mechanism 
for endeavoring to increase the UAE nationals’ population. 
In other words, one might argue that practicing polygyny at 
younger ages may help UAE to increase the fertility and, 
thus, the population growth of its nationals. 
This particular issue is beyond the direct scope of 
this dissertation, but my findings do show some relevance 
for using polygyny as a mean for increasing UAE nationals’ 
fertility. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that 
polygyny is not the most important factor influencing 
Emarati women’s fertility. In fact, age of the husband and 
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woman’s age at marriage are among the most important 
factors that influence Emarati women’s fertility, 
regardless of the type of union they enter. For instance, 
the findings of my dissertation have showed that with 
regard to current fertility, as age of husband increases, 
wife’s fertility deceases by 6 per cent, controlling for 
other variables. With regard to cumulative fertility, one 
year increase in woman’s marriage age lower her fertility 
by 6 per cent, controlling for other variables. 
Another important factor that influences current 
fertility is female labor force participation. The findings 
of this dissertation have demonstrated that the fertility 
of employed Emarati women is 26 per cent less than that of 
unemployed Emarati women, controlling for other variables 
Moreover, the argument that polygyny could well 
influence the population growth rate by producing more 
children, might not be particularly well-grounded because 
as Chojnacka (1980), argues “the major demographic 
consequence of polygyny is reflected in the very young 
nuptiality pattern for women which directly affects the 
rate of population growth” (Chojnacka 1980: 106). In other 
words, what affects population growth might not be the 
polygyny prevalence by itself, but the fact that women in 
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polygynous marriages marry at young ages and therefore 
produce more children. 
Therefore, a more prudent UAE population policy aiming 
at increasing fertility in order to increase the population 
numbers of nationals would focus on encouraging both women 
and men to marry at younger ages, and on easing the 
incompatibility between women’s work, as well as her desire 
to pursue her education, and her intended number of 
children. These institutional responses are seen by many 
demographers as ways to increase fertility in low fertility 
populations, such as those in Europe and, to a lower 
extent, in the United States (Morgan 2003). 
If the UAE government plans to adopt a national 
population policy through increasing fertility, it needs to 
focus on direct means, not only on the indirect means that 
may or may not have been effective in increasing its 
nationals’ population size. In fact, until now there is no 
clear fertility policy in UAE or in any of the other Gulf 
countries. As previously mentioned, the monthly allowance, 
maternity leave, marriage funds, and other means do not aim 
in the first place at increasing the population of the UAE 
nationals. Instead, they aim at easing the living expenses 
and at providing better heath care for children and their 
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mothers. And with increasing levels of female education and 
labor force participation, it will be very hard to increase 
fertility of the nationals. In fact, many Emarati women 
postpone marriage, and therefore having children, until 
they finish their education, a time when marriage chances 
are diminished. Also, even when women marry by the time 
they finish their education, the postponement of marriage, 
and therefore births, bring the risk that women will not 
have all the children they intended to have. One reason is 
the high level of infecundity at older ages (Morgan 2003). 
Another reason is that the competing demand may interact 
with being “too old” in a social sense, for rearing 
children (Morgan 2003). 
In fact, even though it has not been clearly shown in 
this dissertation, a review of the trends in developing 
countries has shown that there is a strong correlation 
between advanced female education (10 or more years) and 
low fertility (Fargues 1989; Jejeebhoy 1995). Women’s 
education is considered to be one of the transformations 
experienced by the UAE family that has clearly influenced 
their marriage ages. Also, educating and preparing girls 
for a world outside their family circle have given them 
occupational ambitions other than the traditional role of 
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homemaker and mother (Faruges 1989). Caldwell (1982) has 
argued that mass schooling probably has had a greater 
impact on the family in developing counties than it ever 
had in Western countries.  This is so mainly because it 
occurred in many countries at earlier stages of economic 
and occupational development than it did in the West, and 
because by definition the process involved Westernization 
and the Western concepts of gender and family.  Also the 
media has played a substantial role in breaking down some 
of the cultural barriers and in the diffusion of universal 
fertility norms (Caldwell 1982). In fact, the media’s role 
in reflecting Western attitudes and value systems of family 
limitation and small family size has become among the most 
important factors in the contemporary decline in fertility 
in a number of developing countries (Knodel and Van de 
Walle 1979; Caldwell 1982).  This is very true when we 
observe how the attitudes toward values and family size 
among UAE youths have changed after modernization, 
especially, in recent years. For example, many new UAE 
parents believe that the quality of children is more 
important for them than their “quantity.” Many parents are 
favoring fewer and “high-equality” children because they 
believe that each child is unique and deserves substantial 
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parental investment, including financial support and 
parental time and attention (Morgan 2003). So, the 
relatively large family size now is viewed as inconsistent 
with good parenting, a view shared by many parents in both 
developed and some developing countries (see also Bulatao 
1981). This ideological shift is encouraging UAE parents to 
focus attention on just a few children, thus creating 
another challenge for any population policy that the UAE 
government may decide to establish. Furthermore, women’s 
changing attitudes toward themselves and their husbands 
make them believe that bearing numerous children might 
threaten their attractiveness and beauty as well as take 
them away from their husbands, many of whom share with them 
similar attitudes. 
All these factors add a challenge to any population 
policy that the UAE government may be thinking to 
establish, especially when we know that the nationals’ 
fertility rate has fallen from 7.2 in 1985 to 4.6 in 2004 
(Morris 2005). The UAE Human Resources Report (2005: 11) 
has also noted that “the most outstanding development in 
demographic characteristics of the UAE population is the 
sharp and constant decline in the gross fertility rate; 
from 1985 to 2004, it dropped by 57% for the UAE 
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population.” In fact, the fertility rate is expected to 
fall further in the future, leading to a slower population 
growth among nationals. 
Moreover, arguably it is much more difficult to 
increase fertility when it is low than to decrease it when 
it is high (May 2005). As in the case of Singapore, in 1984 
authorities tried to correct some of the excessive results 
of the antinatalist policy. The main goal was to encourage 
fertility among Chinese couples with the highest education 
levels. The new policy has not yet produced conclusive 
results (May 2005), but many have argued that with the 
secular changes (couple’s high educational level, female 
labor force participation, Western value system, and so 
forth), it will be very hard to raise the fertility levels 
to government aspired levels. 
Furthermore, the fertility literature clearly shows 
that “once the fertility transition begins, it does not 
stop until fertility reaches levels of approximately two 
children or lower; once a 10% decline in fertility occurs 
(for any province), an irreversible transition was 
underway” (Mogran and Hagewen 2005: 241). Applying this to 
the UAE, the fertility of UAE nationals has dropped from 
7.2 in 1985 to 4.6 in 2004. This means that the UAE 
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nationals’ fertility has experienced around a 39 per cent 
decline. 
As we have seen in this dissertation, the UAE is not 
the only country in the Gulf experiencing a fertility 
decline. The other Gulf countries are also experiencing 
fertility declines in varying degrees. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are numerous ways to extend this research. One 
is to examine the interaction effect among the independent 
variables. The results reported in this dissertation 
pertain to direct, or main, effects of polygyny and the 
other covariates on women’s fertility behavior. It may well 
be the situation that the effect of polygyny on the 
likelihood of having birth in the last 12 months and the 
children ever born may vary according to the magnitude of 
one or more of the other independent variables. Thus, in 
addition to examining the main effects of polygyny on 
women’s fertility, I might also ask if polygyny has an 
effect on fertility when it is interacting with other 
independent variables. It might be, for instance, that the 
effect of polygyny on women’s reproductive behavior is 
stronger for unemployed women compared to employed women, 
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or for women who reside in rural areas compared to women 
who reside in urban areas. 
Also many studies have shown that age of husband is 
the most important factor affecting couple’s sexual 
activity when the influences of women’s age and marriage 
duration are taken into account. Due to multicollinearity I 
was not able to use women’s age and marriage duration along 
with husband’s age in my models. Maybe new models trying to 
deal with this issue are needed as a way to capture the 
nature and consequences of age of the husband on women’s 
reproductive behavior. 
 A second suggestion would be to examine the 
relationship between polygyny and fertility by wife order. 
Perhaps the aggregate comparison between fertility of all 
polygynous wives with monogamous wives may fail to identify 
variation in fertility among polygynous wives themselves 
which may account for the polygynous -monogamous 
differences. As argued by many researchers, a more 
satisfactory test of examining polygynous-monogamous 
fertility differences requires a comparison of polygynous 
wives specified by wife-order with monogamous wives. Or a 
more sensitive measure of marital status than wife order 
needs to be used, such as the mean number of women in 
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reproductive age married to a woman’s husband during her 
own reproductive career (Mulder 1989). Such a marital 
status measure, Mulder (1989) has argued, can capture the 
extent, nature, and consequences of competition between co-
wives. For instance, this index measures the intensity of 
reproductive competition between co-wives during their 
reproductive years, rather than ranking the wives by order 
of marriage. Thus, one of the problems of wife order is 
that it fails to measure the costs of sharing the husband. 
For example, women may be a third wife in the union, but 
her co-wives may have ceased reproduction more than 20 
years ago, or may even have died. Therefore, she will not 
be in direct comparison with other polygynous wives. 
A third suggestion is to examine the effect of 
polygyny on female fertility controlling for the 
educational difference between husbands and their wives. 
The underlying assumption is that if a wife has more 
education than her husband, she might have more power, 
which therefore might influence the reproductive decision 
making in the family. 
A fourth suggestion is to examine the causes of 
polygyny, or confounding factors associated with polygyny, 
which might be mistakenly viewed as consequences of 
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polygyny. For example, men married to women with whom they 
cannot produce children are more likely to take second 
wives. Childlessness might be higher among the first 
polygynous wives than among monogamous wives, which may 
well affect all polygynous women’s fertility. So, as argued 
by Mulder (1989), a number of alternative explanations must 
be ruled out minimizing the evidence of a selective process 
whereby women of low reproductive potential (for example, 
infertile) are more likely to find themselves in polygynous 
marriages. Unfortunately, the survey data I used in this 
dissertation are the only such survey data available to me 
at this time; there are no data in the UAE survey dealing 
with women’s infertility status. Future research using 
different data needs to take into account the above issues 
to be better able to rule out the above kinds of 
explanations. 
A fifth suggestion is to expand this research to the 
other Gulf countries. The Gulf countries have similar 
social and cultural environments, but to a varying degree 
different economic conditions. Expanding this research 
would be beneficial for the continuation of this research 
because as we have seen the prevalence of polygyny tends to 
be different in the different Gulf countries, with the 
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highest percentage in Saudi Arabia (19 per cent) and the 
lowest percentage in Bahrain and Qatar (8 per cent). Also, 
examining the polygyny-fertility relationship in different 
social settings might expand our knowledge about this 
relationship. 
As previously pointed out, the relationship between 
polygyny and fertility is a complex one. It can not be 
examined definitively with data from a single survey. To 
explore the general effects of polygyny on women’s 
reproductive behavior, more research is definitely needed. 
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APPENDIX A 
MAPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 23.  Map of Asia 
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 Figure 24.  Map of the United Arab Emirates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  204
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/atlas_middle_east/uae_pop.jpg . Map prepared with  1980 
UAE Census data  by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency:  Atlas of the Middle East 1993  
 
Figure 25.  United Arab Emirates Population Density, 1980 
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APPENDIX B 
DISTRIBUTION OF CEB AND UNIVARIATE POSSION 
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   Figure 26.  Distribution of CEB and Univariate Poisson 
              for Emarati Women, 1999 
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